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Evaluating the Fiscal-lnflation Interaction as an Argument for Fiscal Rules 
in the European Economic and Monetary Union
Director: Richard D. Erb, PhD ^^^^^L
There exists a strong historic notion among European central bankers that unchecked 
fiscal policy hampers the monetary policy goal o f price stability. This notion underlies 
many important policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
The fiscal rules of EMU— first outlined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and reinforced 
under the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact—lean particularly heavily on the fiscal- 
inflation interaction assumed by the central banker notion. Much debate emanates from 
the failure o f European Union Institutions to provide adequate empirical support for the 
supposed fiscal-inflation interaction. The result has been, in part, a resistance to the 
fiscal rules by some member states and a general failure to apply the rules.
This paper purposes to provide a first attempt at comparing the fiscal rules to historic 
European experience. European Commission data for 15 countries from 1961-1991 are 
analyzed for evidence o f fiscal effects on inflation performance. Both government deficit 
and debt ratios are examined. Also considered are real interest rates and real growth 
rates. Considered are both timing o f variable movements within countries and variation 
across countries and select country groups. A brief examination o f fiscal-inflation 
interactions from 1999-2003 under EMU is also included.
The empirical record from 1961-1991 presents little support for the central banker 
notion and the fiscal rules o f EMU. Despite budgets close to balance on average— and 
with Germany providing one notable and important exception—the 1961 -1969 period 
saw average inflation well exceed the ECB definition of price stability. The inflation 
surge o f the early 1970s occurred despite improving budget balances on average. The 
subsequent disinflation o f the late 1970s and 1980s occurred despite persistently high and 
rising deficit and debt ratios. Under EMU, fiscal balances do not function well as a 
signal o f  inflation pressures. Overall, the historic record does not support the argument 
for fiscal rules on price performance grounds. It is suggested that an argument with 
better support should be developed if the fiscal rules are to survive and function.
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[MJore than ever before, 1965 showed the degree to which the effectiveness o f  credit 
policy depends on the development o f  public sector budgets, and that it cannot 
compensate, let alone overcompensate, fo r  the expansionary effect o f  high government 
deficits. (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1965)'
The lack o f  sufficient convergence offisca l policies as reflected in large and persistent 
budget deficits in certain countries has remained a source o f  tensions and has pu t a 
disproportionate burden on monetary policy. (Delors Report, 1989)^
Central banks are often accused o f  being obsessed with inflation. This is untrue. I f  they 
are obsessed with anything, it is with fiscal policy. (European central banker, 1995)^
The Stability and Growth Pact supports price stability. (European Central Bank, 2002)*'
The opening quotes highlight the powerful, longstanding belief among European 
central bankers that unchecked fiscal policy hampers the monetary policy goal o f price 
stability. This central banker notion is not only pervasive in Europe but also surprisingly 
powerful.^ Driven by the goal o f price stability, central bankers in Europe arguably have 
carried more weight than any other single group in shaping the emerging Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) since the late 1980s. And, the notion that lax government
' Qtd. in Kitterer (1999), p. 180.
 ̂Committee for the Study o f  Economic and Monetary Union (1989), sec. 2, para. 5.
 ̂Qtd. in Buti (2003).
" ECB (2002).
 ̂Throughout the paper “Europe” and the “European Union” refer to the 12 nations belonging to the EU at 
the time o f  the Maastricht Treaty signing in 1992, plus Austria, Finland, and Sweden, which joined in 1994. 
Including all 15 throughout the period studied makes sense as they were all potential members whose 
economic performance was known at the time. Not all o f the countries belonged to the EU through the 
entire period covered by this paper. Also, it is not implied that what is said about them necessarily applies 
to other European nations.
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budgets interfere with inflation goals has become an increasingly important element in 
central banker driven institutional arrangements. Despite the notion’s policy importance, 
little or no empirical support has been forthcoming.
The central banker notion under discussion did not develop overnight. It was the 
result o f a gradual development—accelerated during the 1970s and 1980s— from at least 
the 1960s until the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. Therefore, a careful study o f relevant 
economic data from these years may provide some insight into the notion’s origins. 
Relying on several important relationships in the data, the paper hopes to add to the 
discussion on fiscal-inflation interactions in Europe. Using the decisions on necessary 
fiscal policy restrictions from the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent Stability and 
Growth Pact (SOP), as well as the theoretical and empirical evidence available in the 
literature reviewed in Section 2, this paper explores the historical record, seeking an 
empirical relationship underlying the EU fiscal limits.
Much o f the analysis involves looking back over the experience o f the tumultuous 
decades preceding the Maastricht Treaty. Given that the Treaty and Pact’s framers 
themselves failed to present adequate empirical evidence for the limits, a simple, obvious 
relationship is not expected. Instead, we proceed with the knowledge that the 
relationship may be a complex one. Nevertheless, one would expect the data to at least 
suggest the shape o f the fiscal restrictions which first the Maastricht Treaty and then the 
SGP deemed essential for the support o f price stability and economic growth in the new 
Economic and Monetary Union.
While this paper can scarcely hope to settle a European debate that barely has 
begun, it can at least investigate the scattered facts that exist and try to organize and add
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to them. The simple fiscal-inflation relationship from 1961-1991 supports only weakly 
the central banker notion that unchecked fiscal policy hampers price stability. Support 
for the specific fiscal limits of EMU is almost entirely absent. Introducing monetary 
policy performance does not alter that finding. Finally, the first 5 years o f  EMU 
demonstrate no significant strengthening o f the fiscal-inflation relationship; in fact, 
preliminary data imply that the relationship may have weakened with EMU.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides some background on the 
development o f the central banker notion that unchecked fiscal policy hampers the goal 
o f price stability, focusing specifically on the institutions deriving from that notion. 
Section 2 reviews the literature for possible theoretical underpinnings for the central 
banker notion, and also briefly summarizes the status o f empirical research in this area. 
Section 3 carefully analyzes the data on fiscal performance and inflation from 1960-1991 
and finds at best a weak empirical case for the central banker notion and even less 
support for the specific fiscal rules o f EMU. Historical experience demonstrates no 
systematic link running either way between fiscal performance and inflation. Section 4 
introduces monetary policy performance into the analysis via real interest rates. Section 
5 examines data related to the fiscal rules from the first five years o f the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). The last section concludes and suggests two areas meriting 
further research. An appendix includes referenced figures and tables from the text.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1. European Economie Background an<} the Development of EMU
The 1960s were prosperous times in Europe as the postwar recovery continued in 
full swing. Annual real GDP growth averaged 5.1 percent, unemployment averaged just 
above 2 percent, government obligations were remarkably low, and budgets were close to 
balance. Enter the 1970s and a macroeconomic horror show of Hollywood proportions. 
The breakup o f the Bretton Woods system, two major oil price shocks, and less than 
optimal policy response to those events left European economies in relative shambles, 
mired in inflation and stagnation. Over the next two decades, annual real GDP growth 
averaged only 3 percent, average unemployment rates soared to 5.5 percent, government 
debt exceeded 30 percent o f GDP on average, and mean deficits neared 3 percent o f 
GDP. Over the first period, inflation rates averaged a moderate 3.7 percent. Over the 
second period, consumer prices were rising on average at an astonishing annual rate o f 
8.9 percent.^
While none argued that the unfavorable events o f the 1970s derived from a single 
source, some European central bankers were quick to point a finger in the direction of 
finance ministries. Monetary authorities believed that part o f their inability to control 
inflation over the period stemmed from deteriorating public budgets and exploding debt 
ratios. According to Kitterer (1999), in 1976 the Bundesbank was specifically “urging 
the consolidation of public sector budgets and a fundamental revision of public sector 
operations” (p. 188). The author also reminds that the Bundesbank “repeatedly stressed 
that the strain on monetary policy becomes unbearable if  it has sole responsibility for
 ̂Source; EC Statistical Annex, Spring 2003. Averages for the first period are reported from 1961-1969, 
for the second period 1970-1991.
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ensuring price stability and that the support o f fiscal policy [. . .] is vital for avoiding 
inflation” (p. 207). During the 1980s, the Bundesbank ideology spread quickly through 
inflation-weary Europe. In fact, Favero (2003) finds that monetary policy in the major 
European economies fell into near lock step with Germany over the period 1980-1991.
As inflation rates fell and economies stabilized across Europe, the importance o f 
monetary leadership and fiscal discipline became firmly ingrained in the economic 
structure of the continent, and in the emerging Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
Brief History of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
EMU was envisioned as a natural part o f the steady progression o f the European 
Community from a loosely bound customs and trade union to something with a more 
unified economic identity. Debate about the shape o f a future EMU can be traced back to 
at least 1969. By then, the initial goals o f the customs union largely had been achieved 
by the then six-member Community. This left the European Community wondering 
where to go next in order to protect and add to its gains on the customs and trade front.
At the same time, the old Bretton Woods system o f international payments fell under 
increasing strain. The dollar was increasingly stretched thin as the main backing o f 
international transactions, and the exchange rate disruptions o f 1968-1969 were just one 
symptom o f this inescapable fact.’ Attempting to reduce exchange rate fluctuations 
within the Community seemed a natural choice.
At the 1969 Hague Conference, the Werner Committee was established to make 
initial recommendations for increased economic and monetary cooperation among the 
members o f the Community. It is interesting to note that only 2 o f 7 committee members
^Ungerer (1997) p. 97-99.
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hailed from central banks, a sharp contrast to the Delors Committee that would follow in 
the 1980s. The final version of the Werner Report included two major institutional 
visions. First, a central monetary authority and common currency (in function if  not 
appearance) remarkably similar to the actual European System o f Central Banks (under 
the ECB) and euro were outlined. The principal difference between the Wemer Report’s 
monetary authority and the realized ESCB is the former’s emphasis on exchange markets 
and the almost complete absence o f price stability among its stated goals and 
responsibilities. In addition, the Wemer Report envisioned a second major institution 
that would have substantial power for national budget oversight and the common 
currency’s exchange rate with the rest o f  the world.* This recommended body never 
materialized as a unique entity, with those powers spread among the present-day 
Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament.
Even before the events o f the 1970s, the Wemer Report perceived a need for the 
immediate convergence o f fiscal policies along with a reduction in exchange rate 
fluctuations. Indeed, the report even alluded to “quantitative guidelines on [. ..]  the 
direction and amount o f balances’’̂ , although no suggestions are provided for the levels 
o f such guidelines. While the proposed fiscal convergence was mostly postponed, the 
Community’s national monetary authorities immediately went to work on harmonizing 
exchange rates among members.
The first attempt at a Community exchange rate system was dubbed “the Snake” 
and consisted o f an agreement to limit the fluctuation of member currencies against one
* Ungerer (1997), p. 107-113.
 ̂Wemer Report, p. 15-24, qtd. in Ungerer (1997), p. 111.
10 Ungerer (1997), p. 114-116.
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another to agreed upon maximums. Differing macroeconomic responses to the 
inflationary shocks o f the 1970s, however, left the Snake with a checkered tenure when it 
was replaced by the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. Highlighting its 
tumultuous seven years, membership dropped from 11 to 6 members through many major 
exchange adjustments. ‘ ‘
In addition to experience gleaned from the Snake, the successor EMS had several 
advantages that contributed to its general success through the 1980s. First, at least 
compared to the 1970s, external economic conditions were generally more stable.
Second, the horrendous economic experience o f Europe the decade before provided 
added motivation for countries to stabilize their economies. Finally, encouragement 
came rapidly in the form o f disinflation and renewed— if still underwhelming—real 
growth. Ungerer (1997, pp. 192-193) also notes that many members o f the EMS and its 
Exchange Rate Mechanism successfully used their membership as political ammunition 
for domestic policies to stabilize their currencies. The relative success o f the EMS 
strengthened the position o f central bankers and renewed interest in a more permanent 
and more ambitious economic and monetary union. It seemed that where national 
governments had largely failed on their own, the environment created by the union o f 
central banks was succeeding.
In 1989, what is usually referred to as the Delors Committee convened with the 
task o f envisioning practical steps toward monetary union. Under the direction o f 
European Commission President Jacques Delors, the group’s final composition reveals 
the new balance of power. Ungerer (1997) explains how suggestions for an independent
Ungerer (1997), p. 119-131.
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panel and for government representatives were rejected. The final selection included 
Delors and one other commissioner, an economics professor, two European private 
bankers, and all twelve national bank presidents.'^ If the odds were stacked in favor o f 
central bankers, they did not disappoint.
The Delors report rendered interpretations o f economic and monetary union that 
fit well with the Bundesbank-led monetary policy theory o f the time. First, in addition to 
scolding the current state o f fiscal budgets, the report specifically called for “binding 
rules for budgetary policies” (para. 25). The first o f these binding rules would “impose 
effective upper limits on budget deficits” (para. 30). These rules, it would seem, were 
meant to replace the incentives o f  the EMS to avoid fiscal pressures on inflation and 
exchange rates. Second, the Delors Committee also envisioned a powerful central bank 
with a clear mandate and tool set. Mirroring the transformation in European central 
banks through the 1980s, the envisioned bank would subordinate all other goals to the 
maintenance o f price stability. While the national central banks would still have a role in 
the day to day functions of the single currency, policy decisions would emanate fi-om the 
central bank itself and would be completely disinterested in national politics. An 
inflexible prohibition on lending to member-states attempted to sever remaining ties 
between monetary policy and fiscal pressures.'^ The vision of the Delors Committee 
would be largely realized in the subsequent Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact, especially with regard to the priority given to the monetary goal o f price 
stability and to the supposed necessary subordination of fiscal policy.
Committee for the Study o f Economic and Monetary Union (1989), Annex I. 
Delors Report (1989), para. 32.
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Maastricht, The Stability and Growth Pact, and fiscal rules of EMU
Among other details, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 quantified the Delors Report’s 
“binding rules.” As prerequisites for EMU entrance, the treaty established an annual 
limit on general government deficits o f 3 percent o f GDP. In addition, general 
government gross debt was to be maintained at or below 60 percent o f GDP, or, if  above 
that mark, falling toward the limit with appropriate s p e e d . E a c h  o f these goals was to 
be reached no later than 1997. The hard limits assuaged Germany and other Bundesbank 
supporters that fiscal miscreants would not haunt the dreams o f the new ECB.
On the other hand, the punishment o f EMU exclusion would presumably not last 
forever, and then what would keep the fiscal reins taut? Led by German Theodore 
Waigel and a coalition o f other finance ministers, and with the backing o f the 
Bundesbank and other central bankers, the Commission drafted and the Council approved 
the Stability and Growth Pact 1997, the year in which the first-round EMU entrants were 
to have met all other Maastricht convergence criteria. In two Council regulations and one 
resolution, the SGP both strengthened the surveillance and response to the fiscal protocol 
of Maastricht and codified the now and forever penalties. In addition to respecting the 3 
percent o f GDP deficit limit, budgets were now to be maintained in balance or surplus 
over the medium term. Debts, which looked hopelessly far from 60 percent, were to be 
largely ignored, but the deficit limit o f 3 percent o f GDP now had the extra bite of a 
clearly delineated penalty procedure, enforced by the Commission. A government found 
in breach could face substantial pecuniary fines, as well as embarrassing publicity.*^
Council and Commission o f  the European Communities (1992) Art. 104(c) and Art. 1 o f Protocol on the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure.
Council o f  the European Communities (1997).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Despite the impressively precise nature o f the new budget rules, no compelling 
economic argument was forthcoming from the European institutions. To be sure, there 
are many appealing arguments in favor o f sustainable government finances. Few 
economists are opposed to fiscal rectitude, per se. However, if  the suggestion o f a theory 
with no empirical support makes economists nervous, the application of one as a concrete 
rule makes them cringe.'^ Events from the 1970s and 1980s and the subsequent 
monetary-led recovery had allowed the notion that fiscal imbalances harm price stability 
to gain considerable acceptance, but little empirical evidence was brought forth in 
support. Begg and Schelkle (2004) declare the underlying model “opaque” (p. 86). 
Canzoneri and Diba (2000) note the lack o f explanation for the SGP and label it an 
“albatross” (p. 2). Eichengreen states that “The ECB is still fighting the inflation wars of 
the 1970s and 1980s.” *̂  The Economist (2001) likens the rules to “monstrous chopping 
machines” and states flatly that the weakly supported arguments for them are “bogus” (p. 
1), These are as close to fighting words as economists get, which begs the question, with 
so much criticism from outside, why was there so little internal resistance to the new 
rules?
One answer appears to lie in the European central bankers’ belief—branded into 
the European consciousness by the events o f the 1970s and 1980s— that excessive fiscal 
laxity burdens the goal o f price stability. The coupling o f this notion with Europe’s 
relatively strong popular support for low inflation makes a formidable political duo. 
Straightforward evidence o f this explanation is found in European Council and
And the SGP was, at least in its construction, decidedly concrete. The automatic exception clause for 
poor economic performance is so restrictive that the requirements would only have been met 9 times by EU 
members over the period 1970-1991.
” Qtd. in Miller et al (2003).
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Commission documents about the Pact and Treaty. For instance, the Council resolution 
adopting the SGP states that fiscal rules are important “to ensure that national budgetary 
policies support stability oriented monetary policies.” '* And, EC (2002) acknowledges 
that “The explicit goal o f these provisions is to make fiscal policies contribute to the 
objective o f price stability in the euro area” and “[fjiscal discipline is important to 
enhance the credibility o f the price-stability oriented framework o f monetary policy”
(p.121).
The honeymoon o f central bank and national government ideas, however, was not 
to last forever. Fiscal policy makers had often used the EMS and its Exchange Rate 
Agreement to their advantage in the 1980s to pass otherwise difficult budget reforms. 
Unless budget developments placed excessive burdens on member’s currency, however, 
such reforms were entirely voluntary. Under the SGP, fiscal balances become both a 
primary target and subject to mandatory adjustment. The resulting tension between 
national governments that found it difficult to stay within the fiscal limits and the SGP’s 
executors and backers perhaps partially explains the lack o f firm fiscal commitments in 
the past.
Economic and Monetary Union was launched on January 1, 1999, and during its 
first six years, the fiscal rules o f Maastricht and the SGP have rapidly decreased in 
popularity among many member governments. Budget projections for 2004 show that 
six o f the twelve members will breach the deficit limit, and none of them are even close 
to the exceptional circumstances enshrined in the Pact.'^ Meanwhile, the Council failed
'* Qtd. in Buti (2003), p. 3.
Source: EC Statistical Annex, Spring 2004.
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to invoke the SGP’s excessive deficit procedure against France and Germany, despite the 
Commission’s recommendation.
The resulting scramble to patch up or modify the Pact has intensified speculation 
about its future. While some governments are ready to see the SGP out the door, the 
ECB and several finance ministers seem prepared to defend it.̂ ® In view o f this paper, 
the most interesting point in the now raging debate is the one which is so obviously 
missing. That is, the unsettled empirical issue o f whether loose fiscal policy really is a 
drag on the maintenance of price stability. The issue is complex, to be sure, but this 
paper proposes a question which would greatly focus the issue. Does historic European 
evidence suggest a link running from poor fiscal performance to increased inflation?
Parker (2004).
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2. Theory and Empirics Behind Fiscal Effects on Inflation
A sound first step in any exploration is to obtain a decent map. In exploring 
a seldom tread area like this one, the map may need to be drawn. To develop such a map 
to guide us through the central banker notion that fiscal discipline is important for price 
stability in Europe, we turn to the broader field o f fiscal policy effects on inflation over 
the medium to long-run. In the short-run, one can easily see the potential for fiscal policy 
to affect price movements through, for instance, indirect tax and regulation changes. For 
Keynesians at least, excess demand pressures could be added to that short-list. Tracing 
the link through to the medium-term requires more footwork.
The literature naturally divides into three areas, and that division is followed here. 
First, a fiscal authority may directly pressure its central bank, using political leverage to 
aid the fiscal authority’s goals or to patch up debt financing problems. Second, a fiscal 
authority may indirectly pressure its central bank through policies which spill over into 
monetary policy’s variables o f interest—including aggregate demand, interest rates, and 
exchange rates. Third, according to the recently developed Fiscal Theory o f the Price 
Level, a fiscal authority may directly affect the price level, bypassing monetary policy 
entirely. Within these broad categories, there appear to be some theoretically credible 
channels through which fiscal policy, over time, could affect inflation performance.
Whether theory plays out in practice must be examined empirically. To this end, 
a brief survey o f the sparse but relevant empirical work in this area is presented. 
Unfortunately, the majority of recent empirical work focuses on the developing world, 
which usually operates in a very different macroeconomic environment from that o f 
modem Europe. Most relevant are studies by Campillo and Miron (1996) and Catao and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Terrenes (2003), since they include most or all o f the EU members in their data sets.
Also relevant is a brief study by the Bank o f Israel on fiscal and monetary interactions 
under fiscal rules. Existing empirical studies were not intended, nor are they adequate, 
either to explain or substantiate the central banker notion o f interest in this paper. The 
empirical work does, however, offer some cursory evidence on fiscal-inflation 
interactions, and those findings and models provide a good base from which to launch 
this paper’s investigation.
Direct Pressure by Fiscal Authority
Direct pressure on a central bank by a fiscal authority is perhaps the most 
straightforward channel through which fiscal policy might affect price stability. As debt 
and the subsequent repayment burden in a country increase, the option of inflating some 
of it away becomes increasingly more attractive. Canzoneri and Diba (2000) explain that 
while direct pressures to inflate are rare, pressures to lower interest rates or for a more 
favorable exchange rate are fairly common. If  political pressure can successfully 
leverage a central bank into lowering rates, the resulting drop in interest payments on the 
debt can greatly improve the demeanor o f government accountants. Additionally, less 
revenue leaking out o f the coffers into debt repayment also frees up funds for more 
politically lucrative spending programs. Finally, lower interest rates—in the near-term—  
may support other government interests such as lower unemployment and higher growth. 
Given that political cycles for fiscal authorities tend to be relatively short, near-term 
results may be all that matters.
Accommodating a fiscal authority’s pressure for lower interest rates harms the 
prospect o f price stability in several ways. First, let us imagine a central bank with the
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exclusive goal o f price stability. This central bank would, we assume, have been 
maintaining interest rates in order to meet its inflation target over some time period.
Now, assume the fiscal pressure is effective, and the bank acts to reduce interest rates in 
the economy. The resulting increase in loaned funds in the economy would place upward 
pressure on prices as output rose beyond its “natural” or inflation-neutral rate— the rate o f 
output growth supported by actual productivity gains. If we assume the bank had chosen 
the right interest rate path in the first place, any deviation from that path must be price 
destabilizing.
In addition, a second blow to price stability occurs through a loss o f monetary 
credibility. A central bank gains credibility through a variety o f channels, and an 
important one is the bank’s perceived independence. If a bank caves in to political 
pressure and lowers rates despite contrary price evidence, it could quickly lose 
credibility. This would compound the problem by placing additional upward pressure on 
prices and possibly contribute to exchange rate instability and a sharply declining 
currency which could amplify the upward price pressures.
Finally, a bank which gives in to political pressure also fails in its role as a check 
on fiscal solvency. An anticipated interest rate rise represents one o f the costs facing a 
government considering expanding deficits. A fiscal authority facing a strong central 
bank must take this reaction into account when setting budgets. If a central bank has a 
history o f accommodation, this cost may fall or disappear altogether in the fiscal decision 
making process. The result would be a higher probability o f increasing fiscal deficits in 
the future and the beginnings o f a vicious circle.
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Indirect Pressure via Fiscal Policy Effects
Next, even though a sufficiently independent central bank may successfully resist 
direct political pressure to lower rates, it may still not be immune to indirect pressures. In 
addition to measurable variables in the economy, a central bank must contend with 
inflation expectations. Canzoneri and Diba (2000) argue that as fiscal deficits and debt 
rise, inflation expectations also may rise. If this happens, a monetary authority is forced 
to make a choice. By raising nominal interest rates, a bank can attempt to hold inflation 
to its target rate, but the higher rates would likely have undesirable consequences on 
output and unemployment. Furthermore, higher interest rates combined with slowed 
output growth and unemployment could easily exacerbate the very deficit and debt 
problems that triggered the messy chain o f events. Artis and Winkler (1999) offer the 
Reagan-Volcker clash in the U.S. and German reunification in Europe as examples o f the 
sort of unsavory results that can be expected when monetary policy stays the course o f 
price stability as fiscal deficits and debt rise.
Because o f the high costs o f maintaining price stability when excessively loose 
fiscal policy affects price expectations, Canzoneri and Diba (2000) argue that the most 
likely outcome is one o f monetary policy choosing a middle ground. On the one hand, a 
central bank could stand firm to its interest rate targets as if  nothing were happening and 
accommodate the inflation. On the other, it could tighten monetary conditions enough to 
completely choke off the added price pressures. The argument is that most central banks 
would raise interest rates enough to soften the blow to its inflation targets but not enough 
to completely maintain them. As long as the fiscal pressures remain, Canzoneri and Diba 
(2000) maintain, inflation will continue to drift away from the central bank’s target.
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ECB (1999) offers a related view o f indirect fiscal pressure on a central bank with 
important differences. In the ECB scenario, a fiscal authority running consistent deficits 
begins to affect efficiency due to crowding out of more productive resources. As saving 
and investment in the economy decline, aggregate demand increasingly outstrips 
aggregate supply. Among other negative results, the excess demand pressures prices. As 
in the previous example, monetary policy must choose a course between accommodating 
the inflation or attempting to quash it by raising interest rates. Again, the higher rates 
could set off another round of problems.
The foreign sector may constitute another channel through which indirect fiscal 
pressure can gain leverage on a central bank’s price stability goal. If a country’s currency 
is significantly depreciating relative to major trading partners due to rising inflation 
differentials, a central bank would normally act to strengthen the currency by raising 
interest rates. However, if  these events coincide with high and rising deficits, two 
potential pitfalls appear. First, the central bank may be forced or persuaded to attenuate 
the rate hikes due to fears o f worsening the government’s fiscal situation. Second, even 
if  a strong central bank reacts with strong interest rate increases, the underlying inflation 
is unlikely to subside entirely without declines in deficit and debt ratios, since the rate 
increases will tend to worsen the government’s fiscal position. Given time, it is argued, 
even the most respected o f central banks will begin to feel pressure for lower interest 
rates from a large section o f the economy. The high rates, if  held over a considerable 
period, start to weaken investment, raise unemployment, and damage growth potential
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over the longer-term. The result, again, might be a loosening o f monetary policy and a 
unpleasant cycle o f inflation fed by the foreign sector and mounting deficits and debt.^' 
Thus, indirect pressures— especially over time— may pose a credibility problem 
for even a relatively strong central bank. Forced to raise interest rates to protect price and 
currency stability, a bank could conceivably become more vulnerable to direct pressures. 
If the high rates correspond with declining output and rising unemployment, a fiscal 
authority could use the negative events as leverage in a public call for lower rates. 
Undesirable exchange rate movements may have a similar effect. Through the indirect 
pressure o f high deficits and rising debt, even a strong central bank may lose some o f  its 
grip on inflation.
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
Regardless o f a central bank’s reaction to fiscal policy, the Fiscal Theory o f  the 
Price Level (FTPL) suggests a channel through which fiscal policy can directly impact 
long-run inflation. In a standard macroeconomic model, the fiscal authority adheres over 
time to a budget constraint. The present value o f government receipts must cover the 
present value o f both government expenditure and debt. Price or interest rate changes in 
the present or anticipated in the future force spending or tax collection or both to adjust. 
But what if  they do not adjust, or what if  it is perceived that they may not? If a 
government begins running consistent deficits and accumulating large amounts o f debt, 
the FTPL argues that the classic adjustment mechanism may be turned on its head.
Instead o f government balance adjusting to the price level and interest rates, prices and 
rates may begin adjusting to the government balance! In other words, it may become
Kitterer(1999).
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expected that present government debt will be inflated away, and, in this case, monetary 
policy’s choices do not matter. The FTPL argues that, in an extreme case o f fiscal 
insolvency, monetary policy would lose all control over the price level.^^ Thus, the rate 
o f inflation would be determined by the government budgeting process. This extreme 
conclusion o f the FTPL appears to wilt under criticism.^^ However, Wren-Lewis (2003) 
argues that the FTPL’s finding is still relevant in further explaining how government 
solvency concerns might hamper a monetary authority in pursuit o f stable prices.
Thus, the literature in this area provides some plausible ways in which fiscal 
policy might affect inflation rates over the medium to long-run. Unfortunately, theory 
has little if  anything to offer on the timing o f such effects. Much would seem to depend 
on how seriously economic actors view the threat o f fiscal pressures— direct or indirect—  
on a central bank. This, in turn, would depend on perceptions o f the relative power o f  the 
two, as well as on historic relations between them. One can imagine that a central bank 
with a history o f caving to fiscal pressures, or a fiscal authority with a history o f applying 
such pressures, might hasten and strengthen the response o f inflation to lax fiscal policy.
In brief, theory provides evidence neither o f how powerful fiscal effects on inflation 
might be nor how long they might take to develop. Thus, the presented theories add to 
our exploratory map some trails which may no longer exist, or, indeed, which may never 
have existed. We turn for assistance to some empirical studies of fiscal balance effects 
on inflation.
Canzoneri et al. (2002).
See, for instance. Blinder (2002).
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Empirical Overview
Catao and Terrenes (2003) provide a nice overview o f the empirical literature in 
this area. Most studies attempt to explain the variation in inflation experience across 
countries. Unfortunately for the question at hand, most recent research has focused on 
the developing world and cases o f very high or hyperinflation. While interesting, these 
results are not particularly relevant to current EU members. Among studies that included 
developed countries in the sample, the authors note that none found a statistically 
significant link between fiscal balances and inflation.
With previous findings and techniques in mind, Catao and Terrones attempt to 
remedy some perceived shortcomings. They estimate an ARDL model in which the 
budget constraint, and its theoretical link with inflation, is embedded. The data covers 
the period fi'om 1960-2001, and it includes 107 countries, among them all o f the 15 EU 
members.
The authors find a statistically significant but weak effect o f fiscal balance on 
inflation outcomes in moderate-inflation countries, which by their definition include 8 of 
the 15 EU countries. Like previous studies, however, they uncover no statistically 
significant link between fiscal balances and inflation in low-inflation countries, which 
include the other 7 EU nations. The extreme variety among countries— even within the 
different groupings— raises some questions about the study’s findings, although the 
authors attempt to use techniques which attenuate these problems. Most interesting to
Moderate-inflation countries include Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the 
UK. Low-inflation countries include: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden. 
Their divisions raise some questions. The divisions are made by lopping off the 25 highest and 25 lowest 
inflation countries, leaving the remaining 50 in the moderate category. This results in a rather large and 
sometimes odd juxtaposition o f  countries.
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our inquiry is the result that fiscal effects on inflation seem to diminish as inflation rates 
fall in general. The result casts some doubt about the need for fiscal rules in EMU, given 
that the ECB’s inflation target is one of the lowest in the world.
Campillo and Miron ( 1996) take a different approach in their study on cross­
country inflation variation. They choose a regression model o f average inflation on a 
host o f explanatory variables plucked from the literature on inflation determinants. The 
data set covers the period from 1973-1994 and includes at least 10 o f the EU members 
among the sample o f 62. O f primary interest is the inclusion o f a variable measuring debt 
level in 1975. The authors hypothesize that the initial debt level helps establish the 
required level o f tax revenue over the period. One potential source o f this revenue is 
through an inflation tax. Thus, they predict that a higher initial debt level will increase 
pressures on a central bank to inflate. Their results show that the initial debt level is 
strongly statistically significant and important in both the whole sample and in the 
high income subsample. Other significant determinants o f  inflation were average 
inflation over the previous period (1948-1972), Barro political instability, openness, 
income, income per capita, and quality o f data. was reported as 0.58 for the whole
sample and 0.87 for the high-income subsample.
One shortcoming o f the Campillo and Miron study is that the specification does 
not allow for the effect o f change in variables over the period. For instance, central bank 
independence changed markedly in certain EU countries (and possibly others) in the 
middle of the period. In addition, it seems likely that how a country’s debt developed 
over the period would be at least as important as well as its initial level. A country which 
paid down its debt— or even maintained the level—would be expected to exert less
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pressure on a central bank than one which allowed debt to expand through the entire 
period. Finally, the variable choice and resulting specification in some cases seems 
inappropriate for the high-income group. Furthermore, it is unclear why Barro's political 
instability index—based on the number o f coups and revolutions— would be important in 
western Europe, the US and Japan from the 1970s. Nonetheless, the finding that initial 
debt levels are significant to inflation merits further inquiry.
The two studies provide some limited evidence on fiscal impacts on inflation in 
developed countries. Their samples also include most o f the EU members, though 
neither study provides regional subsamples. Each has some deficiencies, especially for 
answering the questions this paper seeks to raise. Perhaps most surprising, however, is 
the dearth o f such empirical studies. Indeed, only the Catao and Terrones study 
investigated the fiscal balance-inflation link explicitly. Especially given current tensions 
over the Stability and Growth Pact, one would expect such a key justification for the Pact 
to be under some empirical scrutiny.
Less rigorous in nature, a brief study by the Bank o f  Israel examines the effect of 
fiscal policy on inflation under fiscal rules. Sokoler (2002) traces the interaction o f fiscal 
and monetary policy during the first ten years o f a law limiting fiscal deficits. The 
similarities between the Israeli and EMU macroeconomic frameworks are compelling.
The Bank o f Israel is prohibited from direct lending to the government. A 1992 Budget 
Deficit Reduction Law established fixed rules for slowly bringing historically large 
deficits toward budget balance.^^
Sokoler (2002).
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The arrangements proved effective if imperfect until the worldwide slowdown in 
2001. The Israeli deficit rose rapidly in its wake— from near balance in 2000 to 4.5 
percent o f GDP in 2001, and the result was a set o f hard limits on deficits in 2002 and 
2003 of 2.4 and 1 percent of GDP, respectively. At the same time, the Bank o f Israel 
decided to lower interest rates in order to soften the blow of government contraction on 
the economy.
It quickly became apparent from projections that the government would not meet 
the planned deficit limit in 2002. The author links this to a quick reaction in financial 
markets. From 2001, inflation expectations rose to levels easily exceeding central bank 
targets. Meanwhile, the exchange rate depreciated significantly and worries arose about a 
potential major depreciation relative to the dollar.^^
Sokoler (2002) finds in these events evidence that “to maintain the price level and 
financial stability it is necessary to avoid fiscal dominance” (p. 4). While his analysis fits 
well with theories o f fiscal effects on monetary policy targets, implications for Europe are 
still unclear. Foremost, it is unclear whether the degree o f fiscal loosening was most 
important, or instead whether it was the failure to meet a fixed target that most 
contributed to the unpleasant financial events. Furthermore, the central bank lowered 
short-term interest rates considerably (2 percentage points) during 2001, and it is thus 
unclear how the monetary loosening contributed to events.^* In other words, it is not 
evident whether the rising deficit itself or simply its surprise nature was to blame for the 
loss o f price and currency stability that followed.
Sokoler (2002). 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Both theoretical and empirical studies in the area o f fiscal effects on inflation are 
disappointing. The former for their lack o f precision. They provide some logical 
answers to the “how” but cannot help with the “when” and “how much.” The latter 
disappoint for their scarcity and muddied findings. None o f the studies provide a link 
between fiscal policy and inflation that approaches the concreteness o f the Maastricht or 
SGP’s fiscal limits.
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3. Pre-Maastricht Evidence on Fiscal Balances and Inflation, 1961-1991
This section closely examines the empirical record leading up to Maastricht in 
1991 for evidence supporting notion underlying the EMU fiscal rules that fiscal laxity 
harms inflation performance. Does fiscal performance appear to have significantly 
impacted inflation performance? Events during this period provided, by most accounts, 
the impetus that led to two important shifts in macroeconomic thought across Europe.
First, monetary policy, led by the Bundesbank, shifted price stability to the 
forefront o f policy goals. Second, the corresponding idea that limits on government 
deficit and debt were necessary for price stability increased in importance.
Our analysis refers to armual data from EC (2003) from 1970-1991 and is 
presented in full in Appendix B. All 15 EU member-states are represented along with the 
US and Japan. The inclusion o f the US and Japan seeks in part to determine whether 
historic evidence points toward
some difference in Europe that 
necessitates fiscal rules. Also 
included are data averages from 
the 1961-1969 period derived 
from the same data set.
Close examination o f the 
country annual data in Appendix 
B suggests a lack of correlation 
between fiscal deficits and
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inflation. A Pearson correlation confirms the lack o f a significant linear relationship at
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the 10 percent level. Looking at country performances from 1961-1991, similar fiscal 
performances are compatible with a wide range o f inflation outcomes. Relatively poor 
fiscal performance— even near or exceeding the SGP deficit limit on average— did not 
doom a country to relatively poor price performance as experiences in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and the US demonstrate. Conversely, sound fiscal performance— even 
surpluses on average— did little to guarantee relatively strong inflation performance as 
experiences in Finland, Sweden and Denmark attest.
We carefully analyze the data from 1961-1991 to determine whether there is an 
empirical basis behind the fiscal rules. Much of the analysis takes place on carefully 
chosen sub-periods based on important shifts in the macroeconomic environment in 
Europe. Unfortunately, the lack o f clear theoretical or empirical justification for the 
fiscal rules makes such an endeavor difficult. It is simply not clear from which trend or 
trends in the pre-Maastricht data the fiscal rules were derived.
Although we lack information about the underlying model, we do have some 
parameters with which to work. Although mysterious to most, we must assume that the 3 
percent o f GDP and 60 percent o f  GDP figures have some empirical relevance. We also 
know that the Maastricht framers had at their disposal similar data. By retrospectively 
including the Maastricht and SGP fiscal criteria in our analysis, we hope to reconstruct 
the empirical foundations o f the argument for fiscal limits.
EMU Fiscal Limits in Historical Perspective
First, it is useful to sketch European fiscal performance over the period using the 
SGP fiscal criteria as benchmarks. The Maastricht and SGP fiscal criteria between them 
include three major clauses relevant to fiscal policy. First, and most important, fiscal
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deficits are not to exceed 3 percent o f GDP. From 1970-1991, the 15 European countries 
in our sample breached the deficit limit 142 times, or about 43 percent o f the time.
Second, debt ratios are not to exceed 60 percent of GDP. Over the same period 1970- 
1991, debt ratios exceeded 60 percent o f GDP 85 times in the 15 European countries, or 
about one-quarter o f the time. And, finally, budgets over the medium-term are to remain 
close to balance or in surplus. While this was achieved on average in the 1960s, only 
four countries met that goal over the 1970-1991 period.^^ Thus, the fiscal limits under 
discussion would appear to address a perceived historic problem in Europe and not just 
fears about future fiscal performance. That being the case, we can examine more 
precisely what exceeding the limits meant for inflation performance in the past.
Since the deficit rule has proven the most prominent o f the three, it is worth 
examining deficit performance over the entire period in some detail. The frequency o f 
excessive deficits varies substantially across countries. Experiences range from Finland, 
which never exceeded the limit, to Italy, which surpassed the limit in each o f the 22 
years. Appendix C presents the sometimes surprising results. The problem o f excessive 
deficits as addressed by the Maastricht fiscal criteria is o f staggering proportions when 
viewed over the 1970-1991 period. Excessive deficits are constrained neither to a small 
number o f occurrences nor a small subset o f countries. Indeed, even the US and Japan 
would have run afoul o f the Maastricht and SGP deficit criteria nearly half of the time.
The four countries (average budget balance as percent o f GDP) were Denmark (-0.5), Finland (3.6), 
Luxembourg (2.3), and Sweden (0.5).
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Certainly, some country performances fit with the idea that frequent excessive 
deficits contribute to poor price performance, but others are a difficult fit with the theory. 
Germany turned in the best Chart 2
inflation performance and 
also relatively sound fiscal 
performance over the period. 
Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and 
Italy experienced 4 o f  the 5 
worst inflation performances 
and also experienced 4 o f the 
5 highest excessive deficit 
frequencies. It should be 
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the group of poor performers Ireland and Italy experienced significantly more periods of 
excessive deficits yet maintained substantially lower average inflation rates.
The rest of the ordering proves a puzzling match to the central banker notion. The 
Nordic countries and France present disappointing inflation performances despite a low 
occurrence rate o f excessive deficits. Greece, Spain, the Netherlands (and the US) 
highlight an impressive range o f average inflation rates (16.1 to 5.0 percent) 
corresponding to identical deficit performances ( II  excessive deficit occurrences) across 
the countries. Meanwhile, the Benelux countries (along with the US and Japan) 
demonstrate a wide range o f deficit performances (fi'om 1 to 20 excessive deficit periods) 
compatible with roughly the same low average inflation rate (from 5.0 to 5.7 percent).
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The correlation between excessive deficits and inflation performance proves no less 
diverse than between deficit levels and inflation.
With the fiscal limits in mind, two main analytical techniques are used to examine 
more closely each country and sub-period for which sufficient data is available.
Emphasis is placed on the excessive deficit rule for several reasons. Debt ratios have 
been largely ignored in the fiscal rules process as evidenced by the number o f EMU 
members that failed the debt ratio criteria upon entrance. The close to balance rule 
proves difficult to examine historically, since most European countries ran significant 
deficits over most or all o f the period. The excessive deficit rule has also been the focus 
of the wider fiscal rules debate in the EU.
To examine the possibility that loose fiscal policy contributed to poor inflation 
performance in the three decades before Maastricht, this paper performs two main 
empirical tests. First, we examine inflation differences across countries grouped by 
similar fiscal performance based on the Maastricht and SGP guidelines during three 
distinct subperiods. Second, for the 1970-1991 period for which annual data is available, 
we examine the timing o f major inflation and fiscal shifts in each country. The 
preponderance of evidence as analyzed supports neither the supposed link between fiscal 
performance and inflation nor the structure o f the EMU fiscal rules.
1961-1969
Despite strong growth and low unemployment, the 1960s provides little evidence 
to justify the Maastricht and SGP fiscal criteria. Annual data are not available from EC
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for this period; however, period averages for 1961-1969 can be constructed for 13 EU 
countries and provide some insight.^®
From an EU-wide perspective, the period from 1961-1969 saw an average fiscal 
budget close to balance at -0.1 percent of GDP. 8 of the 13 countries with available 
budget data (Spain and Sweden are unavailable) ran budget surpluses on average.
Despite the relatively strong fiscal performance, inflation over the 1961-1969 period 
averaged 3.5 percent, well above the ECB’s current interpretation of price stability as 
close to but less than 2 percent.
Only in Germany did inflation meet the ECB’s price stability criterion; in fact, 
one might point to 1960s Germany as a close historic model to the EMU ideal. Germany 
averaged a budget surplus o f 0.5 percent o f GDP and an average inflation rate o f just 1.6 
percent over the period. Real GDP growth averaged 4.3 percent—somewhat below the 
European average o f 5 percent—but much stronger than average growth during the other 
periods covered in this study. Given that performance, it is perhaps no surprise that 
Germany was the leading advocate for fiscal rules under EMU.
Real annual growth o f GDP in the 15-country European sample averaged a robust 
5 percent during the period, and unemployment averaged just 2.2 percent. As a reference 
point, the US over the same period registered averages o f -1 .2 percent of GDP budget 
balance, 2.2 percent inflation, 4.7 percent annual real GDP growth, and 4.7 percent 
unemployment.
Fiscal data are unavailable for Spain and Sweden for the period.
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Chart 3
Inflation and Fiscal Balance, 
1961-1969
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record average deficits exceeding 3 percent o f GDP over the period. Irish inflation 
averaged 4.3 percent. The 1960s experience indicates that while excessive fiscal deficits 
Table 1:1961-1969 may have a weak impact on inflation
performance, the effect is not pronounced. 
Indeed, even in Ireland average inflation rates
Fiscal Group n Inflation Growth
Close to 
Balance/Surplus
9 3.4 5.0
Deficit 3 3.5 5.1
Excessive Deficit 1 4.3 4.4
were higher than the best fiscal performers by less than one percentage point.
Real growth numbers are included as a rough proxy of an extension o f the central 
banker notion known as “macroeconomic stability.” Recently, some European central 
bankers have begun to point to a more complex link between fiscal performance and the
For the period 1961-1969, countries were grouped as follows: Close to Balance/Surplus: Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, UK; Deficit: Belgium, Italy, 
Netherlands; Excessive Deficit : Ireland.
Throughout this section, “close to balance or in surplus” is defined as a budget deficit ratio less than or 
equal to 0.5 percent of GDP. “Deficit” is defined as a budget deficit ratio to GDP greater than 0.5 percent.
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monetary policy goal of price stability. Those central bankers view poor fiscal 
performance not as limiting the attainment o f price stability but instead as increasing the 
“cost” o f price stability in terms o f economic growth or other macro variables. In the 
words o f ECB (2004), fiscal policy’s effectiveness at maintaining macroeconomic 
stability “defines the environment in which monetary policy has to operate.”^̂
Fiscal contributes to macroeconomic stability through two main channels. First, 
by allowing tax revenues to decrease (increase) and income-sensitive expenditures to 
increase (decrease) during a recession (expansion), government budgets provide 
automatic stabilization that smoothes income changes in the short-run. Second, avoiding 
excessive deficit and debt accumulation over the longer-term may foster macroeconomic 
stability by improving the decisions o f economic actors, who would otherwise have to 
account for additional risks.
Government budgets that do not contribute to macroeconomic stability may result 
in lower potential for economic growth. The resulting environment may also require 
higher interest rates from a monetary policy authority for the same level o f inflation. 
Because real growth rates are probably the end result o f such an unsavory policy mix, and 
because interest rates are difficult to compare across countries, this paper employs real 
growth rates as a rough but useful first look at fiscal policies and macroeconomic 
stability.
There is little initial evidence from the 1960s that budgets close to balance or in 
surplus improve growth outcomes. Countries with mild deficits (0.8 to 2.2 percent of
”  p. 45.
ECB (2004).
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GDP) on average achieved slightly higher real growth rates than those countries with 
stronger fiscal positions. Ireland’s below average growth performance leaves open the 
possibility for the interpretation that excessively loose fiscal policy reduce 
macroeconomic stability and thus reduce real growth rates. A more rigorous study o f the 
effect on growth would examine country-specific factors in more depth. The direction of 
causality would also require examination. For instance, poor growth performance can 
lead to higher deficits due to increased non-discretionary and discretionary government 
spending during slowdowns. Finally, while not mentioned by ECB (2004), monetary 
policy could also act as a destabilizing force if  monetary policy were inappropriate for 
macroeconomic conditions. Unfortunately, Irish interest rate data is unavailable from EC 
(2003).
1970-1974
The 1970s brought to Europe a rapid departure from the relatively strong growth 
and stability o f the 1960s. Inflation surged between 1970 and 1974. Fiscal balances did 
not deteriorate until after 1974. By 1974 Plot 1
inflation rates in the EU countries 
averaged 15.3 percent, a more than 
fourfold increase from the 1960s average. 
The average deficit in EU countries in 
1974 climbed only 0.5 percentage points, 
to a deficit of 0.6 percent. Given the 
average decline in real growth rates from
EU-15 Fiscal Balance 
and Inflation Rate, 1970-1974
Inflation —e— Balance
1961- 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
1969
the 1960s average to 1974 o f 2.8 percentage points, such a decline would be consistent
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with the functioning of automatic stabilizers. There is no evidence that fiscal balances 
were deteriorating significantly before the inflation peak. Using annual data for fiscal 
balances and inflation, we can examine this relationship more closely.
Even setting aside the issue o f timing, fiscal performance proves unable to explain 
the variety o f  experiences during the initial inflation from 1970-1974; there simply is no 
systematic correlation between the two variables. Based on the central banker notion that 
poor fiscal performance hampers price stability, we would expect to find that countries 
running relatively high and rising deficits in the 1960s and early 1970s would experience 
relatively greater increases in inflation. As the notion would predict, most o f the 
countries with better than average inflation performance from 1970-1974 also had sound 
public finances before and during the period. One exception among the above average 
inflation performers— Belgium—proves more difficult for the notion to explain. Despite 
poor fiscal performance in the 1960s and a deteriorating budget in the early 1970s, 
Belgium’s inflation increase o f 3.2 percent over the 1960s average was nevertheless well 
below the average increase o f  4.9 percent in Europe. Since it is only one case, however, 
further research into country-specific factors might well explain the anomaly.
The larger weakness o f the central banker notion in explaining the early 1970s 
experience lies in explaining the poor inflation performers. Of the 6 countries with worse 
than average inflation performance in the early 1970s, Ireland, Italy, and the UK 
had simultaneously deteriorating fiscal balances. However, Denmark maintained 
consistent surpluses, and, the two worst inflation performers in the early 1970s, Greece 
and Portugal, had relatively mild rises in fiscal deficits, comparable to those in Germany, 
the early 1970s best inflation performer.
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Whether analyzing past or contemporaneous fiscal performance, balances do little 
to predict relative inflation performance during the early 1970s. In favor o f the central 
banker notion, most o f the better inflation performances came in countries with sound 
fiscal backgrounds. To the detriment o f the notion, Belgium’s strong inflation 
performance came despite a checkered fiscal past. Furthermore, half of the poor inflation 
performers— including the two worst—boasted relatively strong fiscal credentials from 
the 1960s and early 1970s. The fiscal rules o f Maastricht and the SGP suggest that sound 
public finances make economies more resilient to price shocks such as those in the early 
1970s. The historic record, however, is often at odds with that assertion.
Next, we more specifically test the Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules by grouping 
countries by fiscal performance relative to the 3 percent deficit criterion over the 1970-
1974 period. The results are similar to 
those for the 1960s, showing some, but 
not dramatic, difference in performance 
between those countries running budgets 
close to balance or in surplus and those running deficits on average. Among the eleven 
countries averaging budgets close to balance or in surplus from 1970-1974, inflation 
averaged 8.3 percent. The UK experienced a mild average deficit o f 0.8 percent over the 
period but saw the deficit ratio rise rapidly to 3.8 percent in 1974. The UK’s inflation 
rate averaged 9.4 percent. Among the three countries averaging deficits greater than 3 
percent o f GDP, inflation averaged 9.6 percent. The data portray a potential correlation
Table 2: 1970-1974
Fiscal Group n Inflation Growth
Close to 
Balance/Surplus
11 8.3 4.9
Deficit 1 9.4 2.7
Excessive Deficit 3 9.6 4.6
For the period 1970-1974, countries were grouped as follows: Close to Balance/Surplus: Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden; Deficit: Germany, Greece, Netherlands, 
UK; Excessive Deficit: Belgium, Ireland, Italy.
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between poor budget performance and worse than average inflation outcomes. The 
effect, however, is hardly dramatic. First, among the three worst performers— with 
average deficits over the period o f 4.5 percent, far exceeding the SGP maximum— an 
inflation premium of only 1.2 percent existed over the best fiscal performers. Second, no 
significant difference is evident between countries running surpluses and those miming 
mild deficits. Finally, the experience of
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Belgium demonstrates that persistently 
high deficits do not mle out good inflation 
performance. While the experience from 
1970-1974 lends some potential support to 
the central banker notion, the effects of 
even substantial excessive deficits are not 
as dramatic as the resulting fiscal ml es' 
strictness suggests.
O f the two countries in breach of 
the 60 percent debt limit, the UK 
performed somewhat worse than average with a 9.4 percent inflation rate and Belgium 
performed significantly better than average with an average rate o f 6.4 percent. No 
significant correlation exists between average debt ratios and average inflation rates over 
the period across 13 European countries with available data.
Real growth figures do not reveal a significant correlation between high fiscal 
deficits and reduced growth, and the period length is probably too short to expect a trend. 
While the surplus countries achieved the highest average real growth rates, those
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countries running excessive deficits on average nearly equaled that performance. 
Examining data on a country basis reveals an even more mixed record and no obvious 
relationship. This result holds whether one looks at absolute growth rates or deviations 
from 1960s average rates.
1975-1991
In the remainder o f the 1970s and into the 1980s, two main trends o f interest 
emerge. First, disinflation to approximately 1960s levels occurred—with varying 
speed—across every European country except Greece and Portugal. The costs o f 
inflation became increasingly acknowledged in Europe and internationally. Real growth 
continued to decline and unemployment rose in most European countries into the 1980s. 
Following the lead o f the Bundesbank, monetary policy tightened considerably— though 
with varying speed— throughout most of Europe. This tightening is evidenced by the 
dramatic shift in real interest rates from negative in every EU country in 1975 to strongly 
positive by the late 1970s and early 1980s in most countries. Second, budget balances 
deteriorated rapidly across most o f  Europe before stabilizing at high deficit levels. Only 
Finland avoided piercing the 3 percent of GDP deficit threshold at least once from 1975- 
1991, and by 1991 seven countries had debt to GDP ratios exceeding 60 percent.
Taken together, those two trends make the central banker stance a problematic fit 
with the European experience reflected by the data. Reconciling rapid disinflation with 
loose fiscal policy proves problematic under the assumption that fiscal laxity places 
upward pressure on inflation. This period o f disinflation serves as an important piece of 
evidence, occurring as it does in the years directly preceding the Maastricht Treaty and its 
fiscal rules.
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If fiscal performance were important for price stability, we would expect that 
countries with low and falling fiscal deficits and debt levels would on average find 
reining in inflation easier. The results here are no more supportive of the central banker 
notion and associated fiscal rules than those from the initial inflation from 1970-1974. 
Most EU countries saw the return o f inflation to 1960s levels or below in the mid-1980s. 
As clearly evidenced by the plots in Appendix D, these disinflations largely occurred 
independently o f significant improvements in government deficits or debt. Indeed, in 
many cases rapid disinflation took place despite deficits consistently in excess o f 3 
percent o f GDP and rising debt levels above 60 percent o f GDP. There is little or no 
evidence that low or substantially Plot 2
EU-15 Fiscal Balance and Inflation 
1961-1991
■ Inflation —«—  Balance
declining fiscal deficits and debt 
either preceded or aided the 
disinflation process over the 
period.
The data do offer some 
weak support for the central banker 
notion under discussion on two 
points. First, one notes that fiscal 
deficits remained very high in 
Portugal and Greece, the two European countries which witnessed the most delayed and 
weakest disinflation through the 1980s. While true, the Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules 
would appear to be an unusually blunt solution to a problem of an occasional outlier or 
two. Additionally, as evidenced by more than a decade o f high and negative real interest
1961- 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 
1969
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rates, both countries saw particularly weak monetary responses to the inflation events o f 
the 1970s. The looser than average monetary policy makes it more difficult to determine 
loose fiscal policy’s role in persistent inflation in Greece and Portugal. Second, an 
argument can be made that while inflation declined to 1960s levels, the ECB’s definition 
o f price stability o f 2 percent inflation was not achieved. Countering this is the fact that 
countries running average budgets in balance or surplus fared no better in meeting the 
ECB standard by the time o f the 1991 Maastricht Conference. It appears that factors 
other than fiscal policy were more important limiters o f disinflation.
To more explicitly test the Maastricht and SGP fiscal criteria for the 1975-1991 
period, we can divide the countries into 3 groups based on fiscal performance.^^ In the 3 
countries averaging budgets close to balance or in surplus, inflation averaged 7.6 percent 
over the period. In the 5 countries with average deficits, inflation averaged 6.5 percent.
In the 7 countries with deficits averaging greater than 3 percent o f GDP, inflation 
averaged 11.4 percent. Clearly, this period provides the strongest evidence of the three 
for the EMU excessive deficit rule. Those countries running consistently excessive 
deficits experienced inflation rates averaging more than 4 percentage points higher than 
the two other groups. The evidence, however, does nothing to support the close to 
balance rule and is mixed on the choice o f 3 percent of GDP as the correct level for that 
limit.
For the period 1975-1991, countries were grouped as follows; Close to Balance/Surplus: Finland, 
Luxembourg; Deficit-. Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, UK; Excessive Deficit-. Belgium, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.
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Fiscal Group n Inflation Growth
Close to 
Balance/Surplus
3 7.6 2.6
Deficit 5 6.5 2.2
Excessive Deficit 7 11.4 2.7
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Table 4 displays average inflation and 
growth rates over the 1975-1991 period with 
countries ranked by average deficits. Among
countries running average budgets close to balance or in surplus over the period 
Sweden, Finland, and Luxembourg—only 
Luxembourg performed significantly
Table 4:1975-1991 inflation and Growth 
by Budget Balance; source: EC (2003)
better than average. None o f the three 
ranked among the top four inflation 
performers.
Just as sound finances did not 
guarantee strong inflation performance, 
poor finances did not rule out strong 
inflation performance. While one can see 
the immediate appeal o f a 3 percent o f
Balance Inflation Growth
Finland 3.4 8.1 2.4
Luxembourg 2.1 5.5 3.7
Sweden -0.4 9.1 1.8
France -1.8 7.7 2.4
Denmark -1.9 7.4 1.6
Germany -2.5 3.3 2.5
UK -2.6 9.6 2
Austria -2.8 4.3 2.5
Spain -3.3 12.1 2.4
Netherlands -4 4.2 2.2
Portugal -6.4 18.5 3.4
Greece -7.6 17.8 2.2
Belgium -7.8 5.1 2.1
Ireland -8.3 10 3.9
Italy -10.2 12.2 2.6
EU-avg -3.6 9 2.5
US -3.8 5.6 2.9
JP -1.7 3.9 4.1
GDP deficit limit, it would appear to be an overly simplistic rule. The seven countries 
(eight, including the US) with average deficits exceeding 3 percent o f GDP over the 
period included some o f the best inflation performers along with the worst. Belgium and 
the Netherlands (and the US) had average inflation rates similar to those of the top 
performers in Europe, each ranking within the top four. In reference to the 3 percent rule, 
it should be noted that among the worst performing group, deficits over the period 
averaged 6.8 percent, more than double the SGP’s single-year limit. Most of the group 
experienced some years of deficits exceeding 10 percent. Thus, even if we assume that at
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least part o f the poor price performance in those countries owes to large fiscal deficits, 
the choice of 3 percent o f GDP as the bound remains puzzling.
Debt ratios exceeding 60 percent o f  GDP do not appear to have been important 
for inflation over the 1975-1991 period. Chart 5
Among the four countries with average 
debt ratios over the period exceeding or 
very close to 60 percent of GDP, average 
inflation was 7.9 percent, lower than the 
9 percent average for the EU. Nor does 
evidence support the combined 
importance o f the deficit and debt ratios. 
One might predict that deficit effects in a
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country with an already high or excessive debt ratio would be higher than deficit effects 
in a low debt country, all else equal. In 1970s Europe, those countries with poor deficit 
performance also tended to have high debt ratios. However, debt performance does not 
help to explain inflation performance variation among countries with similar deficit 
performance. Specifically, Belgium and the Netherlands maintained debt ratios 
considerably higher than did Greece, Portugal, and Spain and similar to those in Ireland 
and Italy. Yet, with similar deficit performance, the two Benelux countries maintained 
substantially lower inflation rates than the other nations. Examining deficit and debt
ratios simultaneously does not improve our understanding o f the fiscal-inflation link 37
A similar result is obtained using the 1970-1974 data, but the comparison is less conclusive due to 
generally low debt ratios. Among the high deficit countries, Belgium’s debt ratio was considerably higher 
than either Ireland or Italy, but Belgium maintained one o f the lowest inflation rates over the period.
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Finally, we return to the concept of macroeconomic stability over the 1975-1991 
period. We might expect to find higher real growth rates in countries which avoided high 
and excessive deficits. The results are inconclusive. Real growth in Europe over the 
period averaged 2.5 percent. O f the above average performers, 3 of the 4 countries ran 
excessive deficits on average (the US also exceeded the European growth average while 
running an average deficit exceeding 3 percent o f GDP). Among the below average 
growth performers, only 4 o f the 9 countries ran excessive deficits on average.
On the other hand, examining changes in growth with 1960s averages as a 
baseline, some correlation between fiscal balances and growth emerges consistent with 
the macroeconomic stability theory. Countries averaging excessive deficits lost an 
average 1 percentage point more growth from their 1960s average rates than did countries 
running only mild deficits on average. Substantial variation remains within groups, 
however. Plots are provided in Appendix E.
A more detailed analysis would be necessary to control for monetary policy 
differences and direction o f causality. It still may be the case that the correlation exists 
because fiscal balances respond to changes in real growth, instead o f the other way 
around. An initial attempt to account for monetary policy differences across countries is 
introduced in Section 4.
Based on our analysis o f inflation and fiscal performance, the subperiod data 
present at best a weak case for a link between fiscal performance and inflation. Debt 
ratios— even in excess of 60 percent o f GDP over many years— demonstrated no 
discernible effect on inflation outcomes. Based on fiscal balances, the difference in 
inflation performance between countries running average surpluses and those running
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deficits averaging less than 3 percent is also negligible over all three periods. There is 
little historic basis for maintaining budgets “close to balance or in surplus” based on 
inflation performance from 1961-1991. The data do suggest some fall off in price 
performance in countries with extremely poor fiscal performance; that is, countries in 
which even the average deficit over many years exceeds the SGP’s single-year limit.
Even so, only in the third period is the inflation premium for those countries dramatic, 
and the 3 percent limit appears unduly strict.
Then, there is the issue o f timing. Even though in extreme cases a correlation 
exists between large fiscal deficits and inflation relative to the rest of Europe, the 
movements of the two variables do not suggest that deficits cause or even precede 
inflation movements. Sharp inflations from 1970-1974 were preceded by generally 
strong fiscal performance in the 1960s and either limited or no fiscal weakening in the 
early 1970s. In addition, the subsequent disinflation in the 1980s coincided with 
consistent fiscal laxity in most o f Europe. Thus, the empirical evidence leading up to 
Maastricht does not reveal a systematic historic link between fiscal and inflation 
performance in Europe, nor does it suggest the EMU fiscal rules.
The best case for the Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules is perhaps one o f nostalgia. 
While inflation returned to 1960s levels by 1991, real growth and unemployment never 
did. Strong growth, moderate inflation, and low unemployment in the 1960s were 
accompanied by budgets close to balance and low debt ratios. It should not prove 
surprising, then, that critical fingers have been pointed at fiscal policy laxity. The leading 
variables in the early 1970s, however, were not fiscal balances or debt ratios but instead 
inflation and real interest rates. Little evidence exists based either on variation across
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countries or timing within countries to suggest that fiscal balances or debt caused these 
movements in inflation or interest rates. If one agrees that the rapid rise in and 
persistence o f inflation over this period imposed most of the macroeconomic cost in 
Europe, then a return path to 1960s prosperity does not go through fiscal policy. Instead 
o f a cause o f the 1970s troubles, deteriorating budgets are perhaps better seen as just 
another result o f the troubles.
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4. Accounting for Monetary Policy
Fiscal policy does not operate in a macroeconomic vacuum, especially with 
regard to inflation, which is widely agreed to be a monetary phenomenon. To this point, 
we have largely ignored differences in monetary policy across countries, but this variable 
is certainly important, and particularly so regarding the inflation experiences across 
countries.
In the early 1970s, the rapid decline o f real interest rates to negative values across 
Europe suggests that monetary
authorities were losing control o f 
inflation.^* As Plot 3 shows, average 
real rates among EU countries fell 
from 3.1 percent in 1970 to -4.9 
percent by 1974. Trends were similar 
in the US and Japan, though the 
decline was less dramatic in the US,
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where real rates fell from 1.6 to -2.4 percent over the same period. Certainly, most would 
agree in hindsight that monetary policy did not respond nearly strongly enough to the 
early 1970s inflation pressures. Unlike movements in fiscal variables, real interest rates 
fell before the inflation peak in 1974 in all EU countries except Ireland, where rates were 
already significantly negative to begin the decade. Thus, loose monetary policy appears 
to have greater potential to explain the rapid inflation in Europe from 1970-1974 than 
does loose fiscal policy.
Short-term real interest rates are calculated as nominal interest rate less present inflation rate.
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After the early 1970s, when monetary policy loosened across Europe, central 
banks varied in the speed with which policies were tightened—as indicated by real 
interest rates returning to positive levels. This presents an interesting natural experiment 
which can deepen our analysis of fiscal policy and inflation. By grouping countries 
according to how quickly monetary policy responded to inflation with a tighter stance, we 
control— at least partially—for monetary policy’s effect on inflation over the period. We 
would expect countries with swifter monetary tightening to enjoy quicker disinflation and 
thus lower average inflation rates over the 1975-1991 period. Within these groups, we 
can examine more precisely whether excessive deficits hampered monetary efforts to 
disinflate.
Three natural groups exist in the data as shown in Table 5.^  ̂ In the first group, 
monetary policy tightened quickly after inflation peaked in 1974-1975, and real interest 
rates were positive in all cases by 1978. In the second group, monetary policy tightening 
Table 5:1975-1991 Fiscal Balance lagged significantly behind the
first group, with interest rates
Monetary Group n inflation Balance Range
Tighten by 1978 7 5.4 -1.9 -7.8, 3.4
Tighten by 1982 6 10.1 -4.4 -10.2. -0.4
Tighten by 1988 2 18.2 -7.0 -7.6,-6.4
returning to positive values only 
by 1982. Monetary policy in the remaining two countries, Greece and Portugal, failed to 
return to positive interest rates until the mid to late 1980s.
As expected, average inflation rates vary significantly from group to group over 
the 1975-1991 period. In the seven European countries comprising the first group, 
inflation averaged 5.4 percent. The second group o f six countries averaged 10.1 percent.
First group: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands; Second group: 
France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, UK; Third group: Greece, Portugal.
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In the third group, inflation averaged 18.2 percent. Reactions o f monetary policy appear 
to have had a powerful effect on inflation outcomes. Both the US and Japan would fall in 
the first group, and their inclusion leaves the average inflation rate essentially unchanged.
Inflation rates in the first group o f countries returned to 1960s levels by 1986 
without exception, and fiscal performance does not immediately appear to have affected 
the relative difficulty o f disinflation. Given the supposed fiscal-inflation interaction, we 
would expect that countries with higher fiscal deficit and debt ratios would find it more 
difficult to disinflate. However, the members o f the first group disinflated to 1960s levels 
with similar speed despite significantly different fiscal histories. Average deficits for the 
1975-1991 period ranged from a 7.8 percent deficit in Belgium to a 3.4 percent surplus in 
Finland. Evidence also fails to point to a more complex “macroeconomic stability” effect 
o f fiscal performance on country economies in the first group.
Based on the macroeconomic stability argument, monetary authorities could 
return inflation to target levels despite a lack o f fiscal support, but the results might be 
higher real interest rates and lower real growth for a time. The data reveal no systematic 
correlation between poorer fiscal performance and either higher interest rates or lower 
growth across countries. Whether examining average or peak real interest rates, good 
fiscal performers such as Denmark and Finland have similar or higher real interest rates 
and similar or lower real growth rates than poor fiscal performers such as Belgium and 
the Netherlands. Only in Luxembourg did above average real growth seem to coincide
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with good fiscal performance.'*®
Among the second group o f countries, real inflation rates returned to positive 
values on average about four years behind the first group. Unlike the first group, a return 
to 1960s level inflation rates was not universal. O f the six countries, only three achieved 
such disinflation by 1991. Fiscal performance does not seem to have systematically 
affected the success o f disinflation. Among the three that achieved disinflation to 1960s 
levels, France’s deficit averaged 1.8 percent, but Ireland and Spain consistently exceeded 
3 percent o f GDP deficit ratios and Ireland exceeded a 60 percent o f GDP debt ratio over 
the entire 1975-1991 period. O f those countries which failed to disinflate to 1960s levels, 
Italy’s deficit averaged 10.2 percent, the UK’s deficit averaged 2.6 percent with a falling 
debt ratio, and Sweden’s 0.4 percent deficit ranked among the best fiscal performers in 
Europe over the period. It should be noted that Sweden experienced large swings in 
budget performance however, with a range o f 6.8 percent deficit to 5.2 percent surplus. 
Poor fiscal performance did not consistently coincide with poor disinflation performance, 
nor did good fiscal performance coincide with good disinflation performance. In fact, the 
relatively low average real interest rates in Italy and the UK over the period suggest that 
poor monetary policy commitment to disinflation may have played the dominant role in 
the failure to disinflate to 1960s levels. Sweden’s prolonged recession during the late 
1970s and early 1980s complicates analysis.
In Portugal and Greece, monetary policy commitment to disinflation was weaker 
still, with real interest rates remaining negative until 1985 and 1988, respectively, and
Data necessary for calculating real interest rates for Luxembourg over the period were missing from EC 
2002. The US experience supports the notion that fiscal performance did not matter much during the 1980s 
disinflation. US real interest rates were low and real growth rates high by European standards despite 
average fiscal deficits of 3.8 percent from 1975-1991.
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reaching minimum rates of -18.2 and -14.4, respectively. It is not surprising that neither 
country achieved disinflation to 1960s levels. Given the calamitous economic situation 
in each country, it is perhaps no surprise that fiscal performance was poor in both cases.
In Greece, average real growth from 1975-1991 had fallen 6.2 percentage points from its 
1960s average, and in Portugal 2.9 percentage points. Even in these cases, however, the 
data provide little support for a determining role o f fiscal policy. Both Greece and 
Portugal began the 1970s as low debt countries, and both maintained debt ratios just 
below the European average o f 48.1 percent over the period. Furthermore, experiences in 
Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands demonstrate that similar or even higher fiscal 
deficits were still compatible with disinflation and modest drops in real growth. Available 
data point to a delayed and weak monetary response as a more likely explanation for the 
persistently high inflation and sharply reduced growth in Greece and Portugal.
By accounting for different monetary stances, some interesting results emerge. A 
swifter response from monetary policy, as indicated by a quicker return to positive real 
interest rates, coincided with substantially lower average inflation over the 1975-1991 
period. Relative fiscal performance appears mostly unrelated to either disinflation 
success— as indicated by a return to 1960s level inflation rates— or the concept of 
macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, fiscal performance appears to correlate neither 
with the speed nor the magnitude o f monetary policy response. Countries that failed to 
achieve disinflation commensurate with our standard shared the traits of slower and 
weaker monetary policy response but otherwise resembled successful countries in terms 
o f fiscal performance.
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A true accounting o f monetary policy differences among countries would require 
a much more rigorous analysis. However, a cursory examination o f the evidence 
supports neither the central banker notion nor the fiscal rules of EMU. The picture that 
emerges is one o f strong monetary dominance. Fiscal performance plays little obvious 
role in either the achievement or the cost o f disinflation. Given the construct o f the fiscal 
rules and their support, we would expect to find at least some evidence that large fiscal 
deficit or debt ratios consistently worsen inflation results. Instead, the picture that 
emerges is one in which a determined monetary authority can return an economy to price 
stability despite deficit and debt ratios up to twice the EMU fiscal limits on average.
And, as evidenced by the experiences o f Belgium and the Netherlands, monetary 
authorities have achieved those results without significantly greater costs in terms o f real 
interest rates or real growth when compared to better fiscal performers. Given this 
picture from historic data and the swift and strong response to inflation deviations 
expected under the ECB, the price stability argument for the strict fiscal rules o f EMU 
requires serious re-examining.
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5. Early Evidence from EMU
Eleven EU countries entered the Economic and Monetary Union in 1999, and 
Greece joined as the twelfth member in 2001. After a decade of convergence efforts, it 
was decided that the members’ economies were similar enough to share a common 
monetary policy. Nominal short-term interest rates are now identical across the 11 (later 
12) countries. Budget balance policy—though governed by the rules and guidelines o f 
Maastricht and the SGP— continues to be set by national governments. Members’ 
inflation rates also continue to partially reflect national conditions with the ECB’s aim for 
inflation below 2 percent based on a weighted average o f the 12 economies.
Although decisions about the fiscal rules were already made, the first five years of 
EMU data prove useful to further test the rules’ importance. After all, some of the 
conditions argued to necessitate the fiscal rules were not in place until monetary union 
was achieved. With a single monetary authority adjusting interest rates primarily to 
average conditions, the ECB is more limited in its potential response to loose fiscal 
policies than a national central bank would be. Following the central banker notion, it 
was hoped that the Maastricht and SGP rules would keep members with excessively 
loose fiscal policies from placing upward pressure on average European inflation.
The majority o f evidence from EMU’s first 5 years does not support the fiscal 
rules o f Maastricht on inflation grounds. In fact, the data—presented in Appendix F—  
highlight some o f the arguments for a modification o f the rules. According to EC (2003), 
EMU members have exceeded the 3 percent o f GDP deficit limit 6 times from 1999- 
2003. Inflation exceeded the ECB’s stated upper limit for price stability o f 2 percent in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
only one o f those six instances. As our analysis o f historical European data would 
predict, excessive deficits have not served as a good indicator of inflation performance.
In fact, the data exhibit a weak positive correlation—not significant at the 10 
percent level—between average fiscal balances and average inflation rates over the 
period. All three countries averaging Chart 6
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significant surpluses over the period also 
averaged inflation rates above the ECB 
target o f 2 percent. O f the three countries 
averaging budgets close to balance, two 
experienced average inflation rates above 
2 percent. Among the six countries 
averaging significant deficits, three had 
average inflation rates above 2 percent.
France and Germany were the only countries to pierce the 3 percent limit twice over the 
period. Each had average inflation rates well below 2 percent. Only in Portugal, which 
experienced a one-year deficit o f 4.4 percent of GDP in 2001 with inflation at 3.8 percent 
the same year, does the excessive deficit rule appear to make sense on inflation grounds.
These findings under EMU are not new, and a lively literature has developed 
around them. Most relevant for this paper is that the link between fiscal performance and 
inflation performance has not noticeably strengthened with monetary union. Indeed, the 
results o f  our brief analysis indicate a continuation of the historical pattern described in 
this paper. If  anything, the relationship between fiscal and inflation performance seems 
to have broken down further as indicated by the positive correlation between fiscal
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balances and inflation. As the historical evidence suggests, it would appear that targeting 
fiscal deficits is not an effective means of safeguarding price stability under EMU.
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6. Conclusions and Further Issues
The notion underlying the fiscal rules o f  EMU is that fiscal laxity makes price 
stability more difficult to achieve. None o f the EU institutional authorities have made 
clear exactly how that notion should be interpreted. This paper argues that one popular 
interpretation—that fiscal laxity results in higher inflation— is not strongly supported by 
historic European data. The case proves especially weak under a monetary authority that 
responds relatively quickly to rising inflation. Preliminary evidence from EMU indicates 
that monetary union has not discemibly altered the findings.
European central bankers and other supporters o f EMU’s fiscal rules have failed 
to present adequate evidence for the rules’ necessity in a monetary union. From 1961- 
1991, fiscal balances and relative debt levels account for neither the timing nor the cross­
country variation of inflation performance in any systematic way. Almost without 
exception, inflation across European countries rose dramatically in the early seventies 
following balanced budgets in the 1960s and preceding significant budget deterioration in 
the 1970s. Furthermore, cross-country variation in the rate o f inflation acceleration in the 
early 1970s appears independent from fiscal policy changes with a given fiscal stance 
compatible with a wide range o f inflation outcomes.
Next, the disinflation o f the late 1970s and the 1980s happened despite 
consistently high deficits and high and growing relative debt levels. Neither did the level 
of disinflation vary systematically with fiscal developments. While it is true that 
countries failed to reach the ECB’s defined level inflation for price stability, this result 
held even among countries running balanced budgets or surpluses on average.
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The only evidence from 1961-1991 that supports the notion that unchecked fiscal 
policy hampers price stability emerges under especially unusual conditions. Countries 
running extraordinarily high deficit levels for many years may have paid an inflation 
premium in certain cases. This premium was—in most cases—not dramatic and the 
effect was usually complicated by correspondingly loose monetary policy.
Finally, early returns from EMU do not suggest inflation in individual countries 
has become any more sensitive to fiscal policies under monetary union. If anything, 
fiscal policy outcomes are an even poorer predictor of inflation performance under the 
single currency.
The results here, o f course, do not rule out alternate interpretations of the original 
notion. Implicit in the central banker notion is a paradox which its proponents could not 
ignore forever. If fiscal discipline were necessary for price stability, then is this not a 
confession by central bankers that they are not in control o f long-run prices? Few 
modem central bankers would openly admit to such powerlessness.
And, still there exists the unshakable notion that excessively loose fiscal policies 
make a central banker’s life mightily difficult, if  not downright unbearable. A new 
formulation is emerging that reconciles the old notion with the growing confidence o f 
central banks on the price-stability front. Padoa-Schioppa (2003), a member o f the 
European Central Bank’s governing council, states the new synthesis succinctly: “With 
lax fiscal policies, price stability does not become impossible but the cost o f achieving it 
may rise” (para. 4). It may be that outliers like Belgium, which consistently achieved 
strong inflation performance despite huge deficits and debt, were after all paying the 
price for fiscal imbalances, just not in terms o f price stability. Likewise, countries like
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Finland, which had relatively weak inflation performance despite solid public finances, 
may have reaped benefits elsewhere in the economy. A first look at results in this area, 
presented in this paper under the term “macroeconomic stability,” fail to show a 
systematic effect of fiscal policy on real growth separate from the effects of monetary 
policy. Nevertheless, it certainly seems plausible that the policy mix effects are not 
confined to the monetary-fiscal-inflation triad. There could instead be complex trade-offs 
among the entire raft o f macroeconomic variables, including some we do not measure 
well. Future research would be well served by beginning to lay out and precisely 
measure those potential effects.
Next, there is the tricky notion o f “price stability.” In this paper, we generally 
viewed price stability as inflation performance relative to the rest o f Europe. But, the 
ECB defines price stability much more precisely as close to but less than 2 percent annual 
inflation. Though not a primary concern o f our study, the ECB’s definition o f price 
stability—and its origins— should also be on the research agenda. Data gathered for this 
study raise questions about the ECB’s low target level. The strong growth and low 
unemployment of the 1960s occurred with an average inflation rate nearly twice that o f 
the ECB target. Like the fiscal limits, the ECB’s inflation target has not been sufficiently 
supported empirically.
Finally, it should be noted that this paper does not intend to argue against fiscal 
responsibility in general or even against the current EMU fiscal rules. There are many 
potentially sound and persuasive economic arguments for some limits on fiscal deficits 
and debt. Given the lack of empirical support for fiscal effects on inflation, however, 
arguing for fiscal limits based on this relationship is counterproductive. Central bankers
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and other promoters o f responsible budgets would do well to better articulate arguments 
for which there is empirical support. Considering the current disrespect for the SGP 
fiscal rules among member states, the arguments for fiscal discipline may soon be put to 
the test. In such circumstances, an argument poorly conceived may be worse than no 
argument at ail.
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Appendix A; Annual Data Summary, 1970-1991
Sources; EC (2003), see Appendix B for details 
* Calculated as Nominal Rate minus Inflation Rate 
** Variables missing more than 3 observations are unreported
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Short-term
Means
Fiscal Real
Real
GDP
Country Balance Inflation Debt Int. Rate* Growth
Austria -1.9 4.8 37.8 1.93 3.2
Belgium -6.8 5.4 92.8 3.82 2.8
Denmark -0.5 8.0 39.8 2.98 1.8
Finland 3.6 8.4 12.6 3.09 3.1
France -1.3 7.7 2.02 2.9
Germany -2.0 3.8 31.7 3.21 2.7
Greece -5.9 16.1 39.1 3.0
Ireland -7.4 10.4 83.4 0.99 4.0
Italy -9.1 11.9 68.1 0.94 3.0
Luxembourg 2.3 5.6 10.5 4.0
Netherlands -3.2 5.0 ** 2.04 2.8
Portugal -4.6 16.6 42 .6 -3.61 4.0
Spain -2.5 11.7 25.8 3.3
Sweden 0.5 8.8 41.8 ** 2.1
UK -2.2 9.6 55.1 1.64 2.2
EU-avg -2.7 8.9 44 .7 1.73 3.0
US -3.3 5.7 1.90 2.9
JP -1.2 5.4 1.69 4.5
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Appendix B: Main Data Table, 1961-1991
Source; EC (2003), Statistical Annex, Spring: Government Net Lending/Borrowing (Fiscal 
Balance), Private Consumption Deflator (Inflation)
1961-1969 averages calculated from published 1961-1973 averages by subtracting out 
1970-1973 annual data 
* Calculated as Short-term Nominal Interest Rate minus Private Consumption Deflator
Short-term
Fiscal Real Real GDP
Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Int. Rate* Growth
AUST 1961-1969 0.5 3.5 4.5
AUST 1970 1.2 3.9 19 1.7 7.1
AUST 1971 1.5 5.0 18 -0.6 5.1
AUST 1972 2.0 6.5 17 -1.3 6.2
AUST 1973 1.2 6.6 17 0.3 4.9
AUST 1974 1.2 10.0 17 -2.7 3.9
AUST 1975 -2.4 7.9 23 -2.4 -0.4
AUST 1976 -3.6 6.5 27 -1.8 4.6
AUST 1977 -2.3 5.6 29 1.9 4.9
AUST 1978 -2.7 3.9 33 2.5 -0.4
AUST 1979 -2.3 4.3 35 1.3 5.3
AUST 1980 -1.7 5.7 36 4.6 2.2
AUST 1981 -1.7 6.9 38 4.5 -0.1
AUST 1982 -3.3 5.5 40 3.3 2.1
AUST 1983 -3.8 4.0 45 1.4 2.9
AUST 1984 -2.5 5.1 47 1.5 0.4
AUST 1985 -2.4 3.5 49 2.7 2.4
AUST 1986 -3.6 1.7 54 3.6 2.1
AUST 1987 -4.2 1.2 58 3.2 1.6
AUST 1988 -3.0 1.5 59 3.1 3.4
AUST 1989 -2.8 2.6 58 4.9 4.2
AUST 1990 -2.4 3.3 57 5.2 4.7
AUST 1991 -3.0 3.5 58 5.6 3.3
1961-1969 0.5 3.5 4.5
1970-1974 1.4 6.4 18 -0.5 5.4
1975-1991 -2.8 4.3 44 2.7 2.5
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Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
BELG 1961-1969 -2.1 3.2 1.8 4.7
BELG 1970 -2.2 2.6 65 5.5 6.2
BELG 1971 -3.2 5.3 65 0.1 3.8
BELG 1972 -4.5 5.6 64 -1.4 5.3
BELG 1973 -3.7 5.9 62 0.7 6.1
BELG 1974 -2.8 12.7 58 -2.1 4.2
BELG 1975 -5.0 12.5 60 -5.5 -1.3
BELG 1976 -5.7 7.8 60 2.5 5.7
BELG 1977 -5.7 7.2 64 0.2 0.6
BELG 1978 -6.1 4.3 67 3.0 2.8
BELG 1979 -6.9 3.9 70 7.0 2.3
BELG 1980 -8.6 6.7 79 7.6 4.4
BELG 1981 -12.5 7.4 92 8.2 -0.3
BELG 1982 -10.7 7.1 102 7.2 0.6
BELG 1983 -11.4 7.1 113 3.3 0.3
BELG 1984 -9.4 5.6 117 5.9 2.5
BELG 1985 -8.9 5.0 122 4.6 1.7
BELG 1986 -9.3 0.4 128 7.7 1.8
BELG 1987 -7.6 1.7 132 5.4 2.3
BELG 1988 -6.7 1.2 132 5.5 4.7
BELG 1989 -6.1 3.8 129 4.9 3.5
BELG 1990 -5.4 2.7 129 7.1 3.1
BELG 1991 -6.2 2.8 131 6.6 1.8
1961-1969 -2.1 3.2 1.8 4.7
1970-1974 -3.3 6.4 63 0.6 5.1
1975-1991 -7.8 5.1 102 4.8 2.1
Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
DENM 1961-1969 1.2 5.6 1.0 4.9
DENM 1970 4.0 7.4 1.6 2.5
DENM 1971 3.8 7.4 12 0.2 2.6
DENM 1972 3.8 9.3 11 -2.0 4.5
DENM 1973 5.1 11.5 8 -3.9 3.6
DENM 1974 3.1 14.3 6 -4.3 -1.4
DENM 1975 -1.3 11.5 7 -3.5 -1.7
DENM 1976 -0.2 11.0 11 -1.7 6.4
DENM 1977 -0.6 9.9 14 4.8 1.1
DENM 1978 -0.3 9.3 24 6.1 1.8
DENM 1979 -1.6 10.2 30 2.3 3.1
DENM 1980 -3.2 9.6 37 7.2 -0.6
DENM 1981 -6.7 12.2 48 2.7 -2.1
DENM 1982 -8.8 9.8 60 6.6 2.7
DENM 1983 -6.9 7.4 69 4.5 1.7
DENM 1984 -4.0 7.0 73 4.5 3.5
DENM 1985 -2.0 4.5 70 5.5 3.6
DENM 1986 3.3 2.8 62 6.3 4.0
DENM 1987 2.3 4.8 58 5.1 0.0
DENM 1988 1.5 4.6 60 3.7 1.2
DENM 1989 0.3 4.7 58 4.9 0.2
DENM 1990 -1.0 2.9 58 8.0 1.0
DENM 1991 -2.4 2.8 63 6.9 1.1
1961-1969 1.2 5.6 1.0 4.9
1970-1974 4.0 10.0 9 -1.7 2.4
1975-1991 -1.9 7.4 47 4.3 1.6
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Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
FINL 1961-1969 2.2 5.0 4.5
FINL 1970 4.2 1.7 12 8.9 7.5
FINL 1971 4.4 6.7 11 1.4 2.4
FINL 1972 3.8 8.5 10 -0.7 7.7
FINL 1973 5.6 12.2 8 -2.9 7.0
FINL 1974 4.5 19.7 6 -9.3 3.2
FINL 1975 4.5 16.1 7 -4.4 1.8
FINL 1976 7.0 14.0 6 -1.6 -0.1
FINL 1977 5.4 11.3 8 0.5 0.3
FINL 1978 3.1 8.2 11 0.4 2.3
FINL 1979 2.6 8.0 11 0.5 6.8
FINL 1980 3.3 11.1 12 2.7 5.1
FINL 1981 4.4 11.7 12 1.0 2.1
FINL 1982 2.5 8.7 14 5.0 3.1
FINL 1983 0.9 8.0 16 6.2 2.7
FINL 1984 2.7 6.9 16 8.9 3.4
FINL 1985 2.8 5.5 16 7.3 3.1
FINL 1986 3.3 2.8 17 8.9 2.5
FINL 1987 1.0 3.1 18 6.9 4.2
FINL 1988 4.0 4.8 17 5.2 4.7
FINL 1989 6.2 5.3 15 7.3 5.1
FINL 1990 5.3 5.5 14 8.5 0.0
FINL 1991 -1.5 5,9 23 7.2 -6.3
1961-1969 2.2 5.0 4.5
1970-1974 4.5 9.8 9 -0.5 5.6
1975-1991 3.4 8.1 14 4.1 2.4
Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
FRAN 1961-1969 0.3 4.0 0.9 5.5
FFtAN 1970 0.9 5.0 3.6 5.7
FRAN 1971 0.6 6.0 0.0 4.8
FRAN 1972 0.6 6.3 -1.0 4.4
FRAN 1973 0.6 7.4 1.9 5.4
FRAN 1974 0.3 14.8 -1.8 3.1
FRAN 1975 -2.3 11.8 -4.2 -0.3
FRAN 1976 -0.7 9.9 -1.2 4.2
FRAN 1977 -0.8 9.4 20 -0.3 3.2
FFtAN 1978 -2.0 9.1 21 -1.3 3.4
FRAN 1979 -0.8 10.5 21 -0.8 3.3
FRAN 1980 0.0 13.0 20 -1.0 1.6
FRAN 1981 -1.9 13.0 22 2.3 1.2
FRAN 1982 -2.7 11.6 26 3.0 2.6
FRAN 1983 -3.1 9.6 27 2.9 1.5
FRAN 1984 -2.7 7.8 29 3.9 1.6
FRAN 1985 -2.8 5.8 31 4.2 1.5
FRAN 1986 -2.7 2.6 31 5.1 2.4
FRAN 1987 -1.9 3.2 33 5.1 2.5
FRAN 1988 -1.6 2.8 33 5.1 4.6
FRAN 1989 -1.2 3.8 34 5.6 4.2
FRAN 1990 -1.5 3.0 35 7.3 2.6
FRAN 1991 -2.0 3.5 36 6.1 1.0
1961-1969 0.3 4.0 0.9 5.5
1970-1974 0.6 7.9 0.5 4.7
1975-1991 -1.8 7.7 28 2.5 2.4
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Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
GERM 1961-1969 0.5 1.6 3.0 4.3
GERM 1970 0.2 3.5 18 5.9 5.0
GERM 1971 -0.2 5.1 18 2.0 3.1
GERM 1972 -0.5 5.6 19 0.1 4.3
GERM 1973 1.2 6.5 18 5.7 4.8
GERM 1974 -1.3 7.1 19 2.7 0.2
GERM 1975 -5.6 6.0 24 -1.1 -1.3
GERM 1976 -3.4 4.2 26 0.1 5.3
GERM 1977 -2.4 3.3 27 1.0 2.8
GERM 1978 -2.4 2.6 28 1.1 3.0
GERM 1979 -2.6 4.2 29 2.7 4.2
GERM 1980 -2.9 5.8 31 3.7 1.0
GERM 1981 -3.7 6.2 35 6.2 0.1
GERM 1982 -3.3 5.1 38 3.7 -0.9
GERM 1983 -2.6 3.2 39 2.6 1.8
GERM 1984 -1.9 2.5 40 3.5 2.8
GERM 1985 -1.2 1.8 41 3.6 2.0
GERM 1986 -1.3 -0.6 41 5.2 2.3
GERM 1987 -1.9 0.5 42 3.5 1.5
GERM 1988 -2.2 1.3 42 3.0 3.7
GERM 1989 0.1 2.9 41 4.2 3.6
GERM 1990 -2.1 2.7 42 5.7 5.7
GERM 1991 -2.9 3.7 40 5.5 5.0
1961-1969 0.5 1.6 3.0 4.3
1970-1974 -0.1 5.6 18 3.3 3.5
1975-1991 -2.5 3.3 36 3.2 2.5
Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate* Growth
GREE 1961-1969 0.6 2.2 8.4
GREE 1970 0.7 3.4 20 8.9
GREE 1971 0.1 2.9 20 7.8
GREE 1972 0.0 4.4 21 10.2
GREE 1973 -0.1 16.1 18 -6.8 8.1
GREE 1974 -1.3 24.9 23 -14.4 -6.4
GREE 1975 -2.9 12.8 20 -3-4 6.4
GREE 1976 -1.7 14.8 20 -4.6 6.9
GREE 1977 -2.5 12.8 20 -3.3 2.9
GREE 1978 -2.9 13.2 26 -3.2 7.2
GREE 1979 -2.4 16.2 25 -5.0 3.3
GREE 1980 -2.6 22.5 25 -6.1 0.7
GREE 1981 -9.0 23.2 30 -6.4 -1.6
GREE 1982 -6.8 21.1 34 -2.2 -1.1
GREE 1983 -7.5 19.4 39 -2.8 -1.1
GREE 1984 -8.3 19.3 46 -3.6 2.0
GREE 1985 -11.6 19.6 54 -2.6 2.5
GREE 1986 -9.4 22.4 56 -2.6 0.5
GREE 1987 -9.1 17.2 63 -2.3 -2.3
GREE 1988 -11.4 15.1 68 0.8 4.3
GREE 1989 -14.2 13.6 72 5.1 3.8
GREE 1990 -15.9 19.8 80 0.1 0.0
GREE 1991 -11.4 19.7 82 3.0 3.1
1961-1969 0.6 2.2 8.4
1970-1974 -0.1 10.3 20 -10.6 5.7
1975-1991 -7.6 17.8 45 -2.3 2.2
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Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
IREL 1961-1969 -3.3 4.3 4.4
IREL 1970 -3.9 12.4 54 2.7
IREL 1971 -3.8 9.4 51 -2.9 3.5
IREL 1972 -3.8 9.7 48 -2.6 6.5
IREL 1973 -4.2 11.6 45 0.6 4.7
IREL 1974 -7.5 15.7 56 -1.1 4.3
IREL 1975 -11.5 18.0 64 -7.1 5.7
IREL 1976 -7.8 20.1 69 -8.4 1.3
IREL 1977 -7.0 14.2 65 -5.8 8.1
IREL 1978 -8.9 8.2 68 1.7 7.1
IREL 1979 -10.5 15.1 74 0.9 3.1
IREL 1980 -11.6 18.6 75 -2.4 3.1
IREL 1981 -12.2 19.6 81 -2.9 3.3
IREL 1982 -12.6 14.9 91 2.6 2.3
IREL 1983 -10.7 9.5 102 4.5 -0.2
IREL 1984 -8.9 7.3 107 5.9 4.3
IREL 1985 -10.2 5.1 110 6.9 3.1
IREL 1986 -10.1 3.7 122 8.7 0.3
IREL 1987 -8.1 2.4 123 8.7 4.7
IREL 1988 -4.2 4.0 118 4.1 4.3
IREL 1989 -1.7 4.0 108 5.8 6.2
IREL 1990 -2.2 2.1 102 9.3 7.6
IREL 1991 -2.3 2.7 103 7.7 1.9
1961-1969 -3.3 4.3 4.4
1970-1974 -4.6 11.8 51 -1.5 4.3
1975-1991 -8.3 10.0 93 2.4 3.9
Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
ITAL 1961-1969 -2.1 3.6 -0.1 5.8
ITAL 1970 -3.3 5.0 38 0.3 5.3
ITAL 1971 -4.8 5.3 43 0.4 1.9
ITAL 1972 -7.0 6.2 49 -1.0 3.2
ITAL 1973 -6.5 14.5 51 -7.5 6.5
ITAL 1974 -6.4 21.6 51 -6.7 5.3
ITAL 1975 -10.5 15.9 57 -5.5 -2.0
ITAL 1976 -8.0 18.1 56 -2.1 6.5
ITAL 1977 -7.1 16.9 56 -2.9 2.4
ITAL 1978 -8.7 12.5 62 -1.0 3.7
ITAL 1979 -8.4 15.8 61 -3.8 5.5
ITAL 1980 -8.7 20.8 58 -3.9 3.5
ITAL 1981 -11.5 18.0 60 1.3 0.8
ITAL 1982 -11.3 17.0 65 2.9 0.6
ITAL 1983 -10.6 14.9 70 3.4 1.2
ITAL 1984 -11.6 11.6 75 5.7 2.8
ITAL 1985 -12.5 9.1 82 5.9 3.0
ITAL 1986 -11.6 6.4 86 6.4 2.5
ITAL 1987 -11.0 5.2 90 6.2 3.0
ITAL 1988 -10.7 5.9 93 5.4 3.9
ITAL 1989 -9.8 6.7 95 6.0 2.9
ITAL 1990 -11.0 6.4 97 5.9 2.0
ITAL 1991 -10.0 7.0 101 5.2 1.4
1961-1969 -2.1 3.6 -0.1 5.8
1970-1974 -5.6 10.5 46 -2.9 4.4
1975-1991 -10.2 12.2 74 2.1 2.6
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Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
LUXE 1961-1969 1.5 2.2 3.6
LUXE 1970 2.8 4.3 19 1.7
LUXE 1971 2.2 4.7 19 2.7
LUXE 1972 2.0 5.1 17 6.6
LUXE 1973 3.3 4.9 14 8.3
LUXE 1974 4.6 10.0 11 4.2
LUXE 1975 1.0 10.2 12 -6.6
LUXE 1976 1.8 9.3 11 2.5
LUXE 1977 2,9 5.7 11 1.6
LUXE 1978 4.4 3.4 10 4.1
LUXE 1979 0.6 4.9 10 2.3
LUXE 1980 -0.4 7.5 9 0.8
LUXE 1981 -3.1 8.6 10 -0.6
LUXE 1982 -1.0 10.6 10 1.1
LUXE 1983 2.0 8.3 10 3.0
LUXE 1984 3.2 6.5 10 6.2
LUXE 1985 6.3 4.3 10 2.9
LUXE 1986 4.4 0.3 9 10.0
LUXE 1987 2.8 0.9 8 4.0
LUXE 1988 2.3 7 8.5
LUXE 1989 3.2 5 9.8
LUXE 1990 4.7 3.6 4 5.3
LUXE 1991 1.8 3.4 4 8.6
1961-1969 1.5 2.2 3.6
1970-1974 3.0 5.8 16 4.7
1975-1991 2.1 5.5 9 3.7
Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
NETH 1961-1969 -0.8 3.8 -0.2 4.9
NETH 1970 -1.1 4.4 1.8 5.8
NETH 1971 -1.0 7.7 -3.2 4.5
NETH 1972 -0.4 8.0 -5.3 3.1
NETH 1973 0.7 9.4 -1.9 5.0
NETH 1974 -0.2 9.5 0.9 4.1
NETH 1975 -2.7 10.0 41 -4.6 0.2
NETH 1976 -2.5 9.0 41 -1.6 4.8
NETH 1977 -0.8 6.1 40 -1.3 2.3
NETH 1978 -2.2 3.8 41 3.2 2.4
NETH 1979 -2.9 4.9 43 4.7 2.2
NETH 1980 -4.1 7.4 46 3.2 1.2
NETH 1981 -5.2 7.1 50 4.7 -0.5
NETH 1982 -6.4 5.5 55 2.7 -1.2
NETH 1983 -5.6 3.7 61 2.0 1.7
NETH 1984 -5.3 2.9 66 3.2 3.3
NETH 1985 -3.5 3.0 70 3.3 3.1
NETH 1986 -4.9 0.2 72 5.5 2.7
NETH 1987 -5.7 0.2 75 5.2 1.4
NETH 1988 -4.4 0.9 77 3.9 3.0
NETH 1989 -4.6 1.4 77 6.0 5.0
NETH 1990 -4.9 2.2 77 6.5 4.1
NETH 1991 -2.8 3.3 77 6.0 2.5
1961-1969 -0.8 3.8 -0.2 4.9
1970-1974 -0.4 7.8 -1.5 4.5
1975-1991 -4.0 4.2 59 3.1 2.2
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Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
PORT 1961-1969 0.9 2.8 6.3
PORT 1970 2.9 3.2 0.8 7.6
PORT 1971 2.1 7.0 -2.7 6.6
PORT 1972 1.0 6.3 -1.9 8.0
PORT 1973 1.7 8.9 15 -4.5 11.2
PORT 1974 -1.0 23.5 15 -18.2 1.1
PORT 1975 -4.0 16.0 22 -9.2 -4.3
PORT 1976 -5.4 18.1 27 -9.7 6.9
PORT 1977 -4.0 27.3 29 -16.2 5.5
PORT 1978 -6.0 21.3 32 -5.8 2.8
PORT 1979 -5.6 25.2 36 -9.1 5.6
PORT 1980 -8.4 21.6 32 -5.3 4.6
PORT 1981 -12.4 20.2 41 -4.2 1.6
PORT 1982 -8.3 20.3 44 -3.5 2.1
PORT 1983 -6.7 25.8 49 -4.9 -0.2
PORT 1984 -10.2 28.5 54 -6.0 -1.9
PORT 1985 -10.1 19.4 62 1.6 2.8
PORT 1986 -5.7 13.8 60 1.8 4.1
PORT 1987 -5.3 9.9 58 4.0 6.4
PORT 1988 -3.4 11.5 58 1.5 7.5
PORT 1989 -2.3 12.8 56 0.9 6.4
PORT 1990 -4.9 11.6 58 5.3 4.0
PORT 1991 -5.8 11.8 61 5.9 4.4
1961-1969 0.9 2.8 6.3
1970-1974 1.3 9.8 15 -5.3 6.9
1975-1991 -6.4 18.5 46 -3.1 3.4
Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
SPAI 1961-1969 5.7 7.7
SPAI 1970 0.6 6.1 15 4.2
SPAI 1971 -0.5 7.7 16 4.6
SPAI 1972 0.2 7.7 14 8.1
SPAI 1973 1.1 11.3 13 7.8
SPAI 1974 0.2 17.7 12 5.6
SPAI 1975 0.0 15.5 12 0.5
SPAI 1976 -0.3 16.4 12 3.3
SPAI 1977 -0.6 23.7 13 -8.2 2.8
SPAI 1978 -1.7 19.1 13 -1.5 1.5
SPAI 1979 -1.6 16.5 15 -1.0 0.0
SPAI 1980 -2.5 15.7 17 0.8 1.3
SPAI 1981 -3.7 14.1 21 2.1 -0.1
SPAI 1982 -5.4 14.4 26 1.9 1.2
SPAI 1983 -4.6 12.3 31 7.8 1.8
SPAI 1984 5.2 10.6 37 4.3 1.8
SPAI 1985 -6.2 8.1 42 4.1 2.3
SPAI 1986 -5.5 9.3 44 2.4 3.3
SPAI 1987 -3.7 5.5 44 10.3 5.5
SPAI 1988 -3.3 4.8 40 6.8 5.1
SPAI 1989 -3.5 6.7 42 8.3 4.8
SPAI 1990 -4.2 6.6 44 8.6 3.8
SPAI 1991 -4.3 6.4 44 6.8 2.5
1961-1969 5.7 7.7
1970-1974 0.3 10.1 14 6.1
1975-1991 -3.3 12.1 29 3.6 2.4
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Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate* Growth
SWED 1961-1969 4.0 4.4
SWED 1970 4.3 5.0 27 2.4 6.5
SWED 1971 5.0 7.6 28 -0.4 0.9
SWED 1972 4.3 6.4 28 0.9 2.3
SWED 1973 3.9 7.6 27 -0.2 4.0
SWED 1974 1.9 10.3 27 -2.5 3.2
SWED 1975 2.6 10.9 27 -2.1 2.6
SWED 1976 4.4 11.0 25 -1.7 1.1
SWED 1977 1.6 10.8 27 -1.1 -1.6
SWED 1978 -0.5 11.6 31 -1.5 1.8
SWED 1979 -2.8 7.9 36 2.6 3.8
SWED 1980 -3.9 12.4 40 -0.7 1.7
SWED 1981 -5.1 12.1 48 1.4 -0.2
SWED 1982 -6.8 10.2 58 3.1 1.2
SWED 1983 -4.9 11.3 62 0.1 1.9
SWED 1984 -2.9 7.6 63 4.3 4.3
SWED 1985 -3.7 6.9 62 7.3 2.2
SWED 1986 -1.2 4.6 62 5.2 2.7
SWED 1987 4.1 5.2 55 4.5 3.3
SWED 1988 3.4 5.9 49 4.3 2.6
SWED 1989 5.2 6.9 44 4.7 2.7
SWED 1990 4.0 9.7 42 4.1 1.1
SWED 1991 -1.1 10.5 51 1.3 -1.1
1961-1969 4.0 4.4
1970-1974 3.9 7.4 27 0.0 3.4
1975-1991 -0.4 9.1 46 2.1 1.8
Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
UK 1961-1969 -0.5 3.6 2.5 3.1
UK 1970 3.0 6.0 79 2.1 2.3
UK 1971 1.3 8.7 75 -2.5 2.1
UK 1972 -1-3 6.5 70 0.3 3.6
UK 1973 -2.7 8.5 65 3.3 7.2
UK 1974 -3.8 17.2 65 -3.8 -1.6
UK 1975 -4.5 23.2 61 -12.6 -0.6
UK 1976 -4.9 15.7 61 -4.1 2.8
UK 1977 -3.2 14.7 60 -6.7 2.3
UK 1978 -4.4 9.5 57 -0.1 3.3
UK 1979 -3.3 13.7 54 0.2 2.6
UK 1980 -3.4 16.2 53 0.6 -2.1
UK 1981 -2.7 10.9 54 3.2 -1.5
UK 1982 -2.5 8.4 52 3.8 2.0
UK 1983 -3.4 5.1 53 5.0 3.6
UK 1984 -3.9 5.1 55 4.9 2.5
UK 1985 -2.9 5.3 53 6.9 3.6
UK 1986 -2.5 4.2 51 6.7 3.9
UK 1987 -1.6 4.4 49 5.3 4.5
UK 1988 0.7 5.2 42 5.1 5.2
UK 1989 1.0 6.3 37 7.6 2.2
UK 1990 -0.9 7.5 34 7.3 0.8
UK 1991 -2.3 7.9 34 3.6 -1.4
1961-1969 -0.5 3.6 2.5 3.1
1970-1974 -0.7 9.4 71 -0.1 2.7
1975-1991 -2.6 9.6 50 2.2 2.0
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Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
EU-15 1961-1969 -0.1 3.5 1.3 5.0
EU-15 1970 1.0 4.9 33 3.1 5.3
EU-15 1971 0.5 6.4 31 -0.7 3.8
EU-15 1972 0.0 6.8 31 -1.3 5.6
EU-15 1973 0.5 9.5 28 -1.2 6.3
EU-15 1974 -0.6 15.3 28 -4.9 2.2
EU-15 1975 -3.0 13.2 31 -5.0 -0.1
EU-15 1976 -2.1 12.4 32 -2.8 4.1
EU-15 1977 -1.8 11.9 32 -2.7 2.6
EU-15 1978 -2.8 9.3 35 0.3 3.1
EU-15 1979 -3.2 10.8 37 0.2 3.6
EU-15 1980 -3.9 13.0 38 0.8 1.9
EU-15 1981 -5.8 12.7 43 1.7 0.1
EU-15 1982 -5.8 11.3 48 2.9 1.2
EU-15 1983 -5.3 10.0 52 2.6 1.5
EU-15 1984 -4.7 9.0 56 3.4 2.6
EU-15 1985 -4.6 7.1 58 4.4 2.7
EU-15 1986 -3.8 5.0 60 5.1 3.0
EU-15 1987 -3.3 4.4 60 5.1 2.8
EU-15 1988 -3.0 4.8 60 4.1 4.4
EU-15 1989 -2.4 5.6 58 5.4 4.3
EU-15 1990 -2.8 6.0 58 6.4 3.1
EU-15 1991 -3.7 6.3 60 5.5 1.9
1961-1969 -0.1 3.5 1.3 5.0
1970-1974 0.3 8.6 30.2 -1.0 4.6
1975-1991 -3.6 9.0 48.1 2.2 2.5
Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
US 1961-1969 -1.2 2.2 1.9 4.7
US 1970 -2.0 4.7 1.6 0.2
US 1971 -2.8 4.3 0.0 3.4
US 1972 -1.3 3.5 0.7 5.5
u s 1973 -0.2 5.4 1.8 5.9
US 1974 -1.0 10.3 -2.4 -0.6
u s 1975 -5.2 8.2 -2.4 -0.3
u s 1976 -3.3 5.5 -0.5 5.6
u s 1977 -2.2 6.6 -1.3 4.7
u s 1978 -1.3 7.1 0.3 5.6
u s 1979 -0.9 8.9 1.2 3.2
US 1980 -2.6 10.8 0.8 -0.2
u s 1981 -2.2 8.8 5.2 2.5
u s 1982 -4.9 5.7 4.9 -2.1
u s 1983 -5.6 4.3 4.4 4.3
u s 1984 -4.8 3.7 5.8 7.3
u s 1985 -5.1 3.5 4.0 3.8
u s 1986 -5.3 2.4 3.6 3.4
u s 1987 -4.4 3.8 2.1 3.4
u s 1988 -3.7 3.9 3.0 4.2
u s 1989 -3.3 4.4 4.0 3.5
u s 1990 -4.4 4.6 3.2 1.7
u s 1991 -5.0 3.8 1.7 -0.5
1961-1969 -1.2 2.2 1.9 4.7
1970-1974 -1.5 5.6 0.3 2.9
1975-1991 -3.8 5.6 2.4 2.9
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Country Year Balance Inflation Debt Real Rate Growth
JP 1961-1969 5.4 10.1
JP 1970 1.6 7.2 1.1 10.3
JP 1971 1.1 6.9 -0.4 4.4
JP 1972 -0.1 5.9 -0.7 8.4
JP 1973 0.5 11.1 -2.8 8.0
JP 1974 0.4 21.0 -6.3 -1.2
JP 1975 -2.7 11.3 -1.2 3.1
JP 1976 -3.6 9.8 -2.5 4.0
JP 1977 -3.8 7.5 -1.1 4.4
JP 1978 -5.4 4.6 0.5 5.3
JP 1979 -4.7 3.6 2.3 5.5
JP 1980 -4.3 7.5 3.2 2.8
JP 1981 -3.8 4.9 2.5 2.8
JP 1982 -3.5 2.8 4.1 3.2
JP 1983 -3.6 2.3 4.2 2.3
JP 1984 -2.0 2.7 3.6 3.8
JP 1985 -0.8 1.8 4.7 4.6
JP 1986 -0.9 0.7 4.3 2.9
JP 1987 0.5 0.4 3.5 4.4
JP 1988 1.5 0.6 3.4 6.5
JP 1989 2.4 2.1 3.3 5.2
JP 1990 2.8 2.6 5.2 5.2
JP 1991 2.8 1.2 6.2 3.3
1961-1969 5.4 10.1
1970-1974 0.7 10.4 -1.8 6.0
1975-1991 -1.7 3.9 2.7 4.1
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Appendix C: 1970-1991 Performance with Respect to Selected EMU Fiscal Criteria
Sources: EC (2003), see Appendix B for details
# years deficit 
ratio
# years debt ratio Avg Avg Avg
Country exceeded 3% 
GDP
exceeded 60% 
GDP
Inflation Balance Real
Rate
Finland 0 0 8.4 3.6 3.09
France 1 0 7.7 -1.3 2.02
Luxembourg 1 0 5.6 2.3
Germany 4 0 3.8 -2.0 3.21
Denmark 5 7 8.0 -0.5 2.98
Sweden 5 4 8.8 0.5
Austria 7 0 4.8 -1.9 1.93
UK 9 7 9.6 -2.2 1.64
Greece 11 5 16.1 -5.9
Netherlands 11 9 5.0 -3.2 2.04
Spain 11 0 11.7 -2.5
Portugal 16 3 16.6 -4.6 -3.61
Ireland 19 17 10.4 -7.4 0.99
Belgium 20 20 5.4 -6.8 3.82
Italy 22 13 11.9 -9.1 0.94
EU>avg 5.7 1.7
US 11 5.7 -3.3 1.90
JP 8 5.4 -1.2 1.69
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Appendix D: Inflation, Fiscal Balance, and Real Interest Rate Country Plots
Austria
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Denmark
Inflation —♦— Balance Real Interest Rate
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France
« — Inflation — Balance Real Interest Rate
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Greece
Inflation Balance Real Interest Rate
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Italy
« — Inflation Balance Real Interest Rate
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Netherlands
Inflation Balance Real Interest Rate
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Spain
Inflation — Balance Real Interest Rate
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Inflation
UK
Balance Real Interest Rate
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Appendix E: Fiscal Balances and Real Growth Rates
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Change in Average Real Growth Rate from 1961-1969 to 1975 
1991, and Average Fiscal Balance 1975-1991
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Appendix F: Fiscal Balance and Inflation in EMU
Source: EC (2003), for definitions se e  Appendix B
Country Year Balance Inflation
AUST 1999 -2.3 0.8
AUST 2000 -1.5 1.4
AUST 2001 0.2 2.2
AUST 2002 -0.2 1.1
AUST 2003 -1.1 1.8
AUST 1999-2003 -1.0 1.5
BELG 1999 -0.4 1.2
BELG 2000 0.2 2.3
BELG 2001 0.5 2.5
BELG 2002 0.1 1.7
BELG 2003 0.2 1.8
BELG 1999-2003 0.1 1.9
FINL 1999 2.2 1.2
FINL 2000 7.1 3.6
FINL 2001 5.2 3.5
FINL 2002 4.3 3.1
FINL 2003 2.3 1.7
FINL 1999-2003 4.2 2.6
FRAN 1999 -2.2 0.4
FRAN 2000 -2.3 1.5
FFÎAN 2001 -2.4 1.6
FRAN 2002 -3.8 2.0
FRAN 2003 -3.9 1.5
FRAN 1999-2003 -2.9 1.4
GERM 1999 -1.5 0.3
GERM 2000 1.3 1.5
GERM 2001 -2.8 1.6
GERM 2002 -3.5 1.3
GERM 2003 -3.9 1.0
GERM 1999-2003 -2.1 1.1
GREE 1999
GREE 2000
GREE 2001 -1.4 3.3
GREE 2002 -1.4 3.4
GREE 2003 -3.0 3.5
GREE 1999-2003 -1.9 3.4
IREL 1999 2.4 3.1
IREL 2000 4.4 4.1
IREL 2001 1.1 4.3
IREL 2002 -0.2 6.0
IREL 2003 0.2 3.8
IREL 1999-2003 1.6 4.3
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Country Year Balance Inflation
ITAL 1999 -1.7 2.1
ITAL 2000 -0.6 2.9
ITAL 2001 -2.6 2.8
ITAL 2002 -2.3 3.1
ITAL 2003 -2.4 2.5
ITAL 1999-2003 -1.9 2.7
LUXE 1999 3.7 1.5
LUXE 2000 6.3 2.6
LUXE 2001 6.3 3.3
LUXE 2002 2.7 2.3
LUXE 2003 -0.1 2.1
LUXE 1999-2003 3.8 2.4
NETH 1999 0.7 1.8
NETH 2000 2.2 3.3
NETH 2001 0.0 4.7
NETH 2002 -1.9 3.1
NETH 2003 -3.2 2.0
NETH 1999-2003 -0.4 3.0
PORT 1999 -2.8 2.1
PORT 2000 -2.8 3.3
PORT 2001 -4.4 3.8
PORT 2002 -2.7 4.2
PORT 2003 -2.8 3.4
PORT 1999-2003 -3.1 3.4
SPAI 1999 -1.2 2.4
SPAI 2000 -0.9 3.2
SPAI 2001 -0.4 3.3
SPAI 2002 0.0 3.5
SPAI 2003 0.3 3.1
SPAI 1999-2003 -0.4 3.1
EU-11 1999 -1.3 1.1
EU-11 2000 0.1 2.2
EU-12 2001 -1.6 2.4
EU-12 2002 -2.3 2.4
EU*12 2003 -2.1 2.0
EU-11/12 1999-2003 -1.4 2.0
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